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1Abstract
This study critically analyzes the historical role and influence of multinational
drug cotpOrations and multinational corporations in general; the u.s. government and
the Canadian state in negotiating the global recognition of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) under GATT/NAFTA.
This process began in 1969 when the Liberal government, in response to high
prices for brand-name drugs amended the Patent Act to introduce compulsory licensing
by reducing monopoly protection from 20 to seven years. Although the financial
position ofthe multinational drug industry was not affected, it campaigned vigorously
to change the 1969 legislation. In 1987, the Patent Act was amended to extend
protection to 10 years as a condition for free trade talks with the u.s. Nonetheless, the
drug industry was not satisfied and accused Canada of providing a bad example to
other nations. Therefore, it continued to campaign for global recognition of IPR laws
under GATT. Following the conclusion of the GATTI Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) in 1991, the multinational drug industry
and the American government, to the surprise of many, were still not satisfied and
sought to implement harsher conditions under NAFTA. The Progressive Conservative
government readily agreed without any objections or consideration for the social
consequences. As a result, Bill C-91 was introduced. It abandoned compulsory licenses
and was made retroactive from December 21, 1991.
It is the contention of this thesis that the economic survival of multinational
corporations on a global scale depends on the role and functions of the modem state.
Similarly, the existence of the state depends on the ideological-political and socio-
economic assistance it gives to multinational corporations on a national and
international scale. This dialectical relation of the state and multinational corporations
is explored in our theoretical and historical analysis of their role in public policy.
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6Introduction
Analytical Relevance of theme.
Access and availability of safe, effective and affordable medicinal drugs is a
fundamental right and necessity for the protection ofhealth and longevity of all humans
especially, the sick and needy. They can prevent· sickness, suffering, pain and disability.
In this context, the success, triumph and hopes of human beings depend on the
availability of collective intellectual resources and knowledge at their disposal for
everyone's medical benefit. Therefore, the monopolization of knowledge through the
state's protection ofextended Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) under GATT/NAFTA
for the multinational drug industry is an affiont against those in need. In the first place,
those who make decisions for the use of drugs are not the users; they only act as
intennediaries, for example, the doctors or drug companies, who prescribe or produce
medicines. For this reason, the above issue acquires great moral importance, because
the sick are at their mercy and have no say in decisions that affect their health care.
Thus, it is relevant to investigate and analyze the various relations between the
people's medical needs and the interests,·whether they are political or economic, of the
state, and ofmultinational drug corporations.
_ 1
7Current Research Work Done on the Theme.
As far as I am aware, not much has been written on this topic. However, there
are some general works produced that are related to the topic but, they are not
necessarily up-to-date. Most of them appear in the fonn of articles in magazines,
newspapers and journals. Just to indicate a few contributors, we may mention authors,
such as Joel Lexchin, Roy Davidson, and organizations, such as The Ecumenical
Coalition for Economic Justice and the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association.1
Consequently, we have chosen to undertake this study, frrstly because of its relevance
to human health, and secondly, we have placed it within the historical context of the
fonnulation of Canadian Public Policy.
Central Hypothesis.
Within the context ofa globalized modem capitalist system there is a dialectical
relation between multinational corporations in general, and the multinational drug
corporations in particular, and the role and functions of the modent state. On the one
hand, the state depends heavily for its existence upon its role to maximize the profits
ofmultinational corporations on a global scale, and on the other hand, the multinational
corporations cannot flourish without the functions, namely the ideologico-political and
socio-economic assistance, of the state, as expressed in its national and intentational
policies and projects.
1. The work of the authors and organizations mentioned above can be seen in the
bibliographic notes between pages 209 and 235.
8In this thesis, I will attempt to verify the above hypothesis by accomplishing five
objectives which correspond to the titles of individual chapters.
Objectives.
In this case, our five main objectives are as follows:
1. To describe and analyze important aspects of the multinational drug industry and its
social and political impact on human health and the state.
2. To elucidate a theoretical analysis of the functions of the State, especially its
ideological role in the fonnulation of Canadian Public Policy and Canadian!American
relations.
3. To illustrate the historic development ofintellectual monopoly phannaceutical patent
rights, the role ofmultinational drug corporations and state policy in Canada.
4. To analyze critically the historical process ofIntellectual Property Rights on a global
scale, with specific reference to the U.S. and Canada, within the framework of the
emergence of GATT and NAFTA.
5. To analyze the role of the state, multinational corporations and Public Policy.
9Methodology•
To achieve these objectives we find it necessary to apply a combination of
certain methods:
A. The historical,
B. The analytical (deduction and induction),
c. The descriptive and
D. The Dialectical
The results of these and future perspectives will be fonnulated in the conclusion.
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Chapter 1
Critical analysis of historic development of multinational drug
corporations
General Introduction
The health and lives ofmillions of Canadians depend on the multinational
phannaceutical industry. The industry as it is today, is about sixty years old and
has become the most profitable of all industries over the past thirty years. It is
ranked first or second place in profitability of all U.S. industries.1 Yet, it has
consistently complained of a litany of factors, ranging from excessive government
controls to the estimated loss of an average $7-$8 billion dollars annually2 due to
patent infringements and the high cost of research and development which it claims
is reducing its profits. Phannaceutical multinationals, it would seem, want to have it
both ways: that is to have total control of the world market and to charge whatever
prices they want, and meanwhile, to benefit from government's protectionist
policies against competition through greater worldwide protection of intellectual
property rights.
Since the advent of the Mulroney government to power in 1984, the Canadian
health care system has experienced severe cutbacks in spending. It was estimated
1. Andrew Chetley Healthy Business? World Health and the Pharmaceutical Industry
(London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1990) p-41. Also see analysis given by Roxanne Snider,
"Patents and Profits." New Internationalists." August 1993.
2.0ECD Globalization of Industrial Activities, 4 Case Studies: Auto Parts, Chemicals,
Construction and Semi-conductor (Paris, OECD, 1992) see introduction.
p-29
11
that since 1983, cuts in federal transfer payments under the Established Programs
Financing (EPF) and the Canada Assistance Plan has resulted in a short fall of $41
billion to the provinces.3 Federal transfers for the fiscal year 1992-93 were reduced
by $9.4 billion. These cut-backs have forced the provinces to reduce their health
care budgets tremendously. Originally, the funding ofhealth care was shared equally
between the federal and provincial governments. In the 1970's, 50 percent ofhealth
care costs were paid for by the federal government but by 1993 the federal
government had reduced its contribution to 24 percent.4 The new Chretien
government promised to reduce health care spending from 10 percent of the GNP to
about 8.5 percent in the near future. Ottawa's share of the costs ofMedicare has
consistently been reduced over the past years.
Doubts are currently expressed about the future success of the mandatol)'
basic principles ofMedicare: public administration, comprehensiveness,
universality, portability and accessibility as stipulated by the 1984 Canada Health
Act. As a result the brunt of the burden on spending on health care is now almost
entirely left to the provinces. Most of them have responded by closing hospitals,
reducing staff, merging certain services, cut down on hospital beds and longer
waiting lists. Some provinces, for example Alberta and Quebec, have already
3. Canadian Center of Policy Alternatives. "The Tory Wreckord." (Ottawa: CCPA.1993)
4. ibid., p-29
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suggested that cut backs in regional transfer programs are forcing them to look at
alteTIlatives to the present system. Alberta is presently pursuing plans to introduce a
two-tier system through user fees while Ontario and Quebec are already planning to
privatize certain services. Other services including drug benefit plans for the poor
and elderly are being reduced in some provinces. Alberta is presently contemplating
privatizing this essential service, while provinces in the Atlantic region have said
they can no longer afford such a service.
The former Tory government's philosophy to favour the conglomerate
financial interests ofmultinationals drug companies above the need of Canadian
citizens and the health care system is evident in high costs ofphannaceutical drugs
today. According to the Canada National Health Expenditures report of 1975-93
"expenditures on drugs continued a decade long trend of being the fastest growing
component of estimated health spending. In 1993, drug spending increased by
8.2 %. The annual rate of increase in drug spending was 8.6 % in 1992 and 10.9 %
in 1991."S In 1993 Canadians spent an estimated $72 billion on health care or about
$2,507 per person of which the costs of drugs represented 15.1%.6 The 'shot gun'
approach to Canada's, phannaceutical policy by the Tory government, to pass the
Drug Patent Act Bill C-91 on the pretext that it was mandated to do so by GATT
s. National Health Expenditures in Canada, 1975-1993. Health Policy and Information
Directorate. (Ottawa: Policy and Consultation Branch, Health Canada, 1994)
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and NAFTA, is a severe blow to the Canadian health care system. Consequently,
Canadians are again paying one of the highest costs for prescription drugs in the
world. Bill C-91 extends monopoly patent protection rights to multinational drug
companies from a period of 10 to 20 years. This move by the Tory-led government
will abolish price competition for an additional 10 years.
Cut-backs to the funding ofhealth care by both the federal and provincial
governments to stem increasing costs are combining to create a crisis in the
provision of health services to the public. To make matters worse, according to the
Center for Policy Alternatives, the U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement pennits
U.s. fmns to take over the management of Canadian hospitals, nursing clinics and
homes, medical and research laboratories, alcohol and drug treatment centers and
ambulance services. Also, under the provisions ofNAFTA all services offered by
government including the health care system are open to privatization.7 According to
U.S. consumer advocate Ralph Nader, "nothing irritates the hospital industry, the
drug industry, the doctors' lobby, the insurance lobby in the U.S. more than the
Canadian universal health system,,,8 and as a result it is targeted to be destroyed
since Americans "cannot bear the presence of an alternative model north of the
border where people in the U.S. can look to. "9
7. Center for Policy Alternatives, Ope cit. p-29
8. Toronto Star. "U.S. Lobby backs drug bill, Nader insists." December 1, 1992, p-A2
9 ·b·d
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The exclusive 20-year monopoly protection from competition for foreign
multinational drug companies does not by any means help the already fragile health
care system. According to Ontario's Health Minister Frances Lankin Bill C-91
would cost her province another $I-billion over the coming decade. 10 The New
York Times has estimated that Canadians will as a consequence pay an additional
$508 million annually for drugs or a 12 percent annual increase in prices. According
to the New York Times report "The added cost would grow to about $800-million
[about $I-billion Canadian] by the late 1990's."11 Other fmancial analysts have
estimated that costs will rise to about $1 billion annually because ofBill C-91, since
the costs of Canadian produced generic drugs are about 30-40% lower compared to
the foreign multinational based products. 12 This savings emphasizes the need again
for a solid and dynamic local industry to compete with the foreign owned.
Traditionally one of the most significant aspects of Canada's social welfare
tradition and its health care policy is that those with low incomes who are ill should
not suffer the consequences ofnot having access to prescription drugs. It has been
estimated that the poor in Canada spend a higher proportion of their income on
prescription drugs than the wealthy. 13 The poor at the same time are forced to spend
10. Globe and Mail "Report says drug patent law will cost Canadians billions." November
17, 1992, p-All
11 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
12. Ruth Scher. "Patent Greed." The Facts Vol. 13, No.3, December 1992. p-39
13. Joel Lexchin. The Real Pushers. (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1984) p-34.
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less money on prescription drugs compared to the wealthy because of financial
reasons. It is argued therefore, that illness is inversely related to the level of
income.14 The increased costs of drugs will severely affect, also, senior citizens who
make up only 11 percent of the population but consume 40 percent of drugs sold in
Canada. IS According to a report by Patterns ofHealth Care in Ontario, the costs of
prescription drugs sold to senior citizens more than tripled between 1985 to 1993.
During this period payments under the Ontario Drug Benefit plan for senior citizens
increased from $212 million to $645 million. 16 Edith Johnson of the National Senior
Citizens Federation, in an interview with the author, noted that the passing ofBill C-
91 "would worsen the problem of access to quality health care to senior citizens
since they will suffer from reduced provincial governments' contribution to Drug
Benefit Plans because ofhigher costs ofprescription drugs."17
The Canadian Patent Act already guarantees 20 years patent protection for
medicines invented and developed here in Canada. However, the multinational drug
industry has chosen to carty out most of its research and development on new
medicines outside of Canada. This emphasizes a need for a strong and vibrant
14. ibid., p-39
IS. House of Commons Debates. November 17, 1992. p-13507.
16. Toronto Star "Seniors and Drugs." June 8, 1994. p-A21
17. Edith Johnson. President ofNational Senior Citizens Federation. Interviewed by
Author, June 25, 1995.
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domestic industry that will not only create jobs but reinvest earnings in the local
sector.
In this chapter, although referring to the international multinational drug
industry, we will be mainly concerned in giving a historical review and analysis of
its history and structure, the role ofresearch and development, safety and high costs
of drugs, profits, the power and influence of the industry and fmally its marketing
and advertising campaign. An appreciation of the inside workings of the drug
industry will help us to understand yet another aspect of its role ofpower and
influence in conjunction with the United States government to institute new
international intellectual property rights regulations within GATT and NAFTA. This
task, needless to mention, was made much easier by the complacent and
encouraging actions by the Canadian state under the guidance and tutelage of the
Tory government. Also excellent support was given by the Canadian business lobby
which by and large is dominated by many U.S. subsidiaries. In the next chapter, we
will analyze the theoretical perspectives of the State and public policy.
History of Multinational Drug Industry.
Most of today',s pharmaceutical companies are offsprings of the European
and particularly the Gennan chemical industry that provided the basis for some of
the early and most important drug discoveries. Significant contributions to the
discovery ofnew drugs were made in the mid- and late- nineteenth century. Some
important discoveries during this period, such as anesthetics, were nitrous oxide
17
(1844), ether (1846), and Chlorofonn (1847). For anginal pain, amylnitrite (1867)
and nitroglycerine (1879) were used. During this period the introduction of synthetic
drugs served as a tremendous break-through for the relief ofpain and fever,
especially the discovery ofyrene (1833), acetanilid (1886), and acetophenetidin
(1887). These important discoveries contributed to the transfonnation of the
chemical industry into the pharmaceutical field thus affecting production of
pharmaceuticals until 1914.18
Because of World War I, the British, French, and Americans were cut off
from vital supplies ofpharmaceutical drugs and synthetic chemicals from Gennany
that severely affected their medical care programs. They were soon forced to
establish their own chemical industries to alleviate the suffering of their population.
The approach adopted by these nations including the U.S. was the duplication and
copying ofbrand name products already created by Gennan scientists and drug
compames.
In 1935, the Gennan parent company ofB.ayer and Hoechst, IG Farben
Industrie discovered Prontosil, a derivative from red dye. It was subsequently
thought to be a very effective treatment against infections including pneumonia,
scarlet and childbed fever and urinary infections. Two years later French scientists
discovered that the active ingredient of the Prontosil was not red dye itselfbut
18. Milton Silverman and Philip R. Lee Pills, Profits and Politics. (California: University of
California Press, Ltd, 1994.) p-4
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sulfanilamide which was already discovered in 1908 but was not recognized for its
genn-killing properties.19 The recognition of sulfanilamide (the first sulfa drug)
paved the way for the creation of other 'wonder drugs', such as penicillin,
streptomycin, tetracycline (the first broad-spectrum antibiotics), cortisone and
hydrocortisone. Other significant discoveries followed with the introduction of
important antibiotic derivatives such as ampicillin and erythromycin. Similar and
other related innovations continued and new areas of therapy that were not
previously susceptible to drugs were opened.20
However, the success ofnew medical discoveries as evident above will lead
to an ever lasting impression of an over zealous and opportunistic industry which
was not only dedicated to curing of diseases but also the wanton killing and
drugging ofmillions ofpersons as documented below. In a series of damaging
reports during the late 1920's and early 1930's the industry was found guilty as a
pusher of illegal drugs, namely heroine and cocaine based products designed
specially for public consumption.
Elmer Bobst, a fonner president ofHofImann-La Roche, confinned in his
autobiography that his company was "heavily involved in the supply ofmorphine to
the underworld between the two world wars." A trial in 1925, in Shanghai,
19. Chetley. op.cit. p-19
20. For more information on this topic see, Silverman and Lee, Ope cit. p-4, Chetley, Ope
cit. p-19
19
confmned that Hoffman La Roche shipped 180 "chests of opium" from Istanbul to
China, also "26 boxes containing mostly heroin, imported from Basle, Switzerland
by a Chinese dealer, Gwando. tt According to Sir John Campbell, chainnan of the
British delegation to the League ofNations Opium Advisory Committee, meeting in
1927, where another case of trafficking was discussed, he "had no doubt whatever
that Hoffman La Roche and Company was not a finn to which a license to deal with
drugs should be given." This was not by any means an isolated incident. At the tum
of the century another drug company known for the discovery of aspirin, Bayer,
promoted the using of heroin "as a panacea for infant respiratory ailments." Yet,
another well known phannaceutical giant Parke-Davis was also found guilty of a
similar act. It developed "coca-cordial, cocaine cigarettes, hypodennic capsules,
ointments and sprays," for consumer sale.21
During the Nazi occupation ofPoland, some drug companies made
agreements with the Nazis to test their products on Jewish and other inmates at
Auschwitz. IG Farben Industrie of Gennany established a chemical plant close to
Auschwitz with the sole purpose of carrying out experiments using inmates from the
concentration camp for testing ofnew drug products. In one of the tests, all 150
inmates died.22 According to The News World, IG Farben also produced "Zyklon-
21. John Braithwaite. Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry. (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1984) p-206. Also see Chetley op.cit. p. 16-20
22.Chetley. Ope cit. p-19.
20
B to gas inmates of the Nazi concentration camps." It also forced more than 350,000
inmates to work in slave camps with "30,000 of them in Auschwitz. "23 After the
second world war IG Farben was liquidated and broken up into BASF, Hoechst and
Bayer. During the Nuremberg war crimes trial, 12 senior drug executives were
sentenced to prison. However, by 1955 one of the jailed executives became the
chairperson ofHoechst and in 1956 another became chairperson ofBayer.24
Evidence of these crimes "are conveniently forgotten by today's executives as they
plot the course of the industry in its modern incarnation as a health care products
industry. "25
Maybe one can argue that the past is the past and it has little bearing on the
future. However, would it be possible to separate the present and future from the
past? Again, the drug industry has consistently provided the answer. But it is
interesting to note that "people who foster dependence on illicit drugs such as heroin
are regarded as among the most unscrupulous pariahs ofmodern civilization. In
contrast, pushers of licit drugs tend to be viewed as altruistically -motivated
purveyors of a social good. ,,26
The drug industry has developed from a pusher of cocaine and heroin-based
23.The News World "IG Farben may compensate WWII labourers." August 10, 1995. p-l0
24. Chetley. Ope cit. p-19
2S ·b·d
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26. Marshall Clinard. Corporate Corruption, The Abuse ofPower. (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1991) p-58.
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products to the "purveyors of social good" through an extensive use and promotion
ofpsychotropic drugs such as, antidepressants and tranquilizers in the 1950's. This
period was known for its greatest innovative boom of the pharmaceutical industry.
Important break-throughs were made on steroids, oral contraceptives, anti-diabetic
and cardiovascular drugs. Also with the help of the introduction of the frrst sulfa
drug the pharmaceutical industry was radically transfonned. According to Silvennan
and Lee, this period "heralded the start of the great drug therapy era. "27
Patents and Pricing of Drugs.
Equally important during this period was the recognition of the important role
ofpatents and the pricing of drugs for the industry. Not all the derivatives from
sulfa, for example, penicillin, cortisone and hydrocortisone, were patented. Later,
improved versions of these drugs were developed such as streptomycin which was
introduced commercially in 1946. However, the patents were licensed widely and
most drug companies produced generic versions sold at significantly reduced prices.
Penicillin for example was sold in 1945 for $60 (10 million units bulk), $4.75 in
1950 and $0.21 in 1960. The cost for streptomycin dropped from $160 (10 grams
bulk) in 1946 to $3.15 in 1950 and to $0.36 in 1960.28 From this dramatic drop in
the prices of drugs, the lesson was clear to Drug manufacturers that price
27. Silverman and Lee. Ope cit. p-4.
28. Gary Gereffi. The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.) p-l07.
22
competition was detrimental to their fmancial interest.
To avoid future price competition, drug manufacturers used their patent rights
to protect and control the production ofnew drugs. According to Garry Gereffi, as a
consequence "firms were able to restrict output of their own drugs to levels where
monopoly profits could be maximized. "29 It also simultaneously increased the
importance of advertising as an alternative to price competition within the drug
industry.
Structure of Pharmaceutical Industry.
The phannaceutical industry is dominated by a relatively small group of
oligopolistic multinationals and many small companies that produce mainly generic
and over-the-counter medicines. Sixty percent of the domestic market in Europe is
controlled by a few multinationals.30 Drugs produced by these multinationals such as
ICI and Glaxo ofEngland, Hoechst and Bayer of Gennany, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz and
Hoffinann-La Roche of Switzerland account for a large portion of sales in their
home market. The U.S. home market is largely dominated by a few large U.S. finns
such as Merck Frost, the world's largest and most profitable producer, American
Home Products, Pfizer, Eli Lilly, Abbot Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squib
corporation, Johnson & Johnson, Smithkline Beecham and Rhone-Poulenc Rore
29. ibid., For a detailed analysis of the above information read the information provided by
Geriffi in his footnote on the same page.
30. OECD. Globalization ofIndustrial Activities, 4 Case Studies: Auto Parts, Chemicals,
Construction and Semi-conductor. (Paris: OECD,1992) p-67
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InC.31 The Japanese phannaceutical [mus are much smaller compared to those of
Europe and the US. In Japan the top five finns account for an average of $1 billion
in sales annually compared to $3 billion per year for the top five European and
American finnS. 32
The world's growth and production ofphannaceutical drugs have almost
doubled since 1975 to $150 billion in 1990 while the world consumption on a per
capita basis rose from $17 in 1975 to $29 in 1990. Three-quarters of the world's
consumption is reported from the industrialized world, while the remaining comes
from the developing and less developed countries. Around two-thirds of the world's
production ofphannaceuticals is produced by about 25 multinational corporations,
while the rest are produced by smaller companies.33
The rapid growth of world consumption ofphannaceuticals has contributed to
the internationalization of the industry that is heavily concentrated with many mega-
mergers and acquisitions among large drug companies. Most recently a new
phenomenon in phannaceutical investment was undertaken in the US. Many large
multinational drug companies are merging with the health insurance industry to take
control ofhospitals, clinics, nursing homes, phannacie~ and doctor's practices.
31. ibid., p-66
32. ibid., p-67.
33. Robert Ballance Janos Pogany and Helmut Forstner The World's Pharmaceutical
Industries, An International Perspective on Inovation, Competition and Policy. (London: Edward
Elgar Publishing Limited, 1992) p-4 and 5.
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Merck, the largest drug manufacturer, took over.a company that "manages the health
benefits of 33 million Americans for nearly 60 times that company's eamingse"34
Another drug giant Eli Lilly paid some $4 billion for PCS, the largest managed
health care company in the U.S., which administers health care plans for 50 million
Americans.35
In April, 1995, the author asked Cam Bailey ofEli Canada if similar
takeovers are planned here in Canada. His response was "I don't think SO."36 A few
weeks later it was announced that Eli Lilly had bought Rx Plus, Canada's second
largest manager ofphannacy benefits. Fears are now being expressed that similar
takeover of phannacy benefits programs such as Green Shield and Shared Health
Network Services by drug companies are in the making that could jeopardize the
sales of cheaper generic drugs. Jim Keon, the vice-president of the Canadian Drug
Manufacturers Association sees the move by Eli Lilly as "a dangerous precedent."37
The take over of other phannaceutical benefit programs could place yet another
important component of Canada's health care system in control of the multinational
drug industry and prevent the supply of cheaper drugs. The control and domination
of Canadian markets by multinational corporations are the highest of all
34. Maude Barlow. The Assault on Health Care-A Time to Act. (Ottawa: Council of
Canadians. mimeo, 1993) p-4.
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36. Cam Bailey ofEli Lilly. Interviewed by Author, Scarborough, Ontario. May 1995.
37. Toronto Star "Lilly buys drug-plan manager." (May 12, 1995) p-E7
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industrialized nations. Some 92 percent of the Canadian drug market is controlled
by foreign multinationals.38 The European phannaceutical markets are quite distinct.
The local production ofphannaceuticals by foreign finns accounts for 60 per cent in
Spain, 50 per cent in France, Italy, and Austria, 35 per cent in Britain, 20 per cent in
Gennany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. Most foreign investments in
Europe are by Swiss multinationals which account for 50 per cent of sales and
American multinationals which account for 20 per cent. Foreign investments in the
US account for just 18 per cent of the U.S.market. In Japan 15 per cent of local
production is accounted for by foreign multinationals.39
Research and Development.
The question ofresearch and development is the most contentious issue that has
beset the functioning ofmultinational drug companies. The drug industry claims that
it spends as much as $250 million to develop a drug. Much suspicion and mistrust
surround the true application, meaning and purpose of the tenn 'research' as used by
the industry. Quite naturally it is an important factor for the survival ofmultinational
phannaceutical industries. For some it invokes a depiction ofmeticulous looking
scientists dressed in spotless·white coats, gloves and goggles surrounded by several
test tubes, computers and other equipment. Whatever picture it conjures in the mind
is one of conscientious scientists working for the benefit ofhumanity. Nevertheless,
38. Eastman, op.cit. p-28
39. OEeD report. Ope cit. p. 72-73.
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this image can be deceiving.
For the industry, as part and as parcel of its campaign to win sympathy and
support from consumers and government decision makers, the regular procession of
charts and diagrams in magazines shows savings to the health care system due to the
introduction of advanced medical discoveries that save lives and prevent diseases.
There is no doubt that advanced medical discoveries attributed to research and
development save lives and prevent some diseases. But another contributory factor
to the general improvement ofhealth ofhumans is the increase of living standards,
better nutritional and hygienic standards.
The term research is subject to wide interpretation that often helps
multinational drug companies to hide many non-research related activities as
research and development. Drug companies have consistently refused to open their
books to the public to prove what it really costs to produce a drug. Therefore, there
are doubts as to how much it really costs to undertake a research project. Within the
multinational drug industry the cost of research and development does not restrict
itself to pure scientific development of a drug but also includes the costs of
promotional expenses for doctors, conferences, sUlVeys and supplies of large
amount of samples to patients for testing and promotions on humans. These 'extra
research' related activities are calculated as monies spent by the industry for
research and development and are all subjected to tax breaks from government. In
the departments of sales, research also includes the expenses inccurred in the testing
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ofproducts, to fmd out the preferences between consumers and health care
practitioners.
Finally, and most importantly for the scientific division of the finn, research
means "the trial of certain chemicals or biological products in perhaps hundreds, if
not thousands, of combinations and fonnulations to develop a specific drug. "40
Added to the industry's effort is research carried out at public expense in hospitals,
universities and government-run laboratories. Drug companies can reduce their risks
in R&D by obtaining substantial tax breaks and other encouragement from
governments. They buy research from other scientists, and are recipients of benefits
from basic research conducted in government and university labs. The knowledge
of the latest scientific discoveries is shared and acquired world wide from scientific
magazines and other publications to better the setvice ofhealth care.
The massive innovative boom by the phannaceutical industry that started after
World War II, reached its apex in the 1950's and continued at a steady pace in the
1960's, with a series ofnew discoveries, but has slowe.d considerably in the 1980's
and 1990's. It has been argued that the annual total ofnew chemical entities
introduced into the world market decreased dramatically "from 93 in 1961 to 48 in
1980. ,,41 This effectively put the drug industry in a deep crisis, and has contributed
40. For the historical data provided on this topic see., Alan A. Klass. There's Gold in Them
Thar Pills. (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1975.) p.20-24. Also see Chetley, op.cit p. 31-50
41. Robert Chew. et aI, Pharmaceuticals in Seven Nations. (London: Office ofHealth
Economics, 1985.) p-27.
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to a world wide industry campaign to push national governments for greater
protection in intellectual property rights. A major reason that explains why the
industry is in an innovative crisis is its policy of carefully selecting which research
projects to undertake, that is based only on the possible financial gains to be made
and not on how many lives can be saved or on how many diseases can be cured.42
The role, influence and analysis of the stockbrokers in advising their clients
and shareholders of the industry whether to invest or discard their shares is the most
important detenninant in influencing the industry's research strategy.43 This
infonnation is based on the market and demand for a particular drug and the amount
ofprofits to be gained from its sale.
The industry is also able to diminish the cost of its research and development
in many ways. To avoid expiring patents, they manufacture "me-too" drugs by
reproducing medicines through slight modification of the molecular fonnula of the
active ingredient of medicines discovered to be successful. The problem of this type
ofreproduction is that it beguiles the public into thinking that the industry is
innovative. For example, an evaluation of 508 new chemical entities (NeEs)
introduced from 1975 to 1984 shows that only 7 percent involved a new chemical
42. Drake and Uhl~an. op.cit. p. 65-85
43.Mike Muller The Health OfNations (London: Redwood Bums Ltd. 1982) p-63, Also
see Chetley, op.cit. p.41-50
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formation of important therapeutic advancement.44 According to Drake and Uhlamn
53 per cent of258 drugs approved in the US for the decade ending in 1991 were
"me too" drugs. But, while there is an abundance of drug products developed, an
F.D.A report revealed that between 1967 and 1984 of the 3443 drugs products on
the market only 12 percent could be rated as "effective for all the indications
claimed, while 40 percent of the products had no effective indication. ,,45 This report
raises serious questions with regards to the merits of investment on research and
development. Here in Canada, according to a study conducted by the Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board, between January of 1988 to December 1990, of the
162 new drugs introduced only 8 represented a significant breakthrough for the
sick.46 Another report, this time by the u.s. special committee on aging, noted that
84 percent ofnew drugs introduced to the market between 1981 and 1988 were of
"little" or "no therapeutic gain." Drug companies, according to the report, "passed
on to consumers about $37 billion for research and development to produce 292
new drugs with little or no potential therapeutic gain over existing drug therapies."
The U.S. study was quoted in a report by the Department of Consumer and
44. Michael Tan Dying for Drugs? PilL Power and Politics in the Philippines. (Hain: Health
Action Information Network, 1988.) p-80.
4S. ibid., p-81.
46. Globe and Mail "Higher costs for health care, higher profit for industry." January 18,
1993. p-A-15.
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Corporate Affairs which was ironically influential in the introduction ofBill C-91.47
Another conspicuous characteristic of today's drug industry is its tendency to avoid
taking risks in undertaking research projects that show not much sign of some
substantial profits. Many analysts have concluded from time to time that drug
companies abandon ongoing research on potentially effective drugs if statistical and
other financial analysis reveals that the expected profit is not going to be big
enough.48 As a result, they allow others like government agencies, university labs
and private individuals to do basic or introductory research until gains can easily be
forecast. Once there are signs that the results would potentially payoff, then drug
companies get involved in the project which leads to increased prices. One can
therefore argue that the high cost of drugs does not necessarily reflect the costs ofR
& D and the level ofprotection of intellectual property rights as the follo~ing
examples demonstrate.
Through a $11 million grant from the National Cancer Institute to researchers
of the Mayo Comprehensive Cancer Center in the US, the drug Levamisole, which
was previously used on sheep to get rid ofparasites, was successfully tested as a
cure for colon cancer~ Fonnerly, it was sold for about $14 to fanners by Johnson &
Johnson for a year's supply but, after its successful test for colon cancer, the price
47. Toronto Star. "Ottawa just says yes to drug firms. "January 18, 1993. p-AI5.
48. Donald Drake and Marian Uhlman. Making Medicine, Making Money. (Kansas City:
Andrews and McMeel, 1993.) p-67.
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rose to $1,250 to $1,500 for the same amount by the manufacturers for human use.
Similarly, the drug AZT (brand name Retrovir) was discovered by US government-
funded scientists in Detroit for the intended use on cancer patients in 1964. Since
the drug was not effective in treating cancer it was ignored for more than two
decades. After the discovery ofAIDS, Burroughs Welcome tested AZT on AIDS
patients and it proved to slow the course of the disease. AZT, which was originally
discovered at American taxpayers expense in 1964, is now sold for thousands of
dollars to AIDS patients.49 The cost in Canada is estimated at about $2,000-$3,000
for a month's supply.
Safety of Drugs
The safety of drugs is a human, moral and ethical obligation on those who
have the responsibility of manufacturing and marketing drugs for the public
consumption. While it has already been suggested that the phannaceutical industry
is not motivated by altruism but by profit for survival, regard for the public ranks to
the bottom. In any given year in the U.S.,
49. ibid., p-67.
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30,000 people will die from adverse drug reactions, 80 percent of
which are thought to be preventable. An additional fifty to a hundred
thousand persons will die from drug-resistant killer forms ofbacteria
whose emergence has been stimulated by the misuse and over
prescribing of antibiotics. so
It has also been calculated that 18 to 30 percent of· patients in all hospitals double
their period ofhospitalization due to severe adverse reactions to drugs, while about
1.5 million people are hospitalized annually from adverse reactions.sl Profits and
services to the public do not necessarily go hand in hand. It is the essence of a
contradiction that ridicules the interest of consumers through an ideology of deceit.
From the very inception of the drug industry the question of safety has been
an issue of concern to millions of consumers. No precise figures are available at this
moment as to the number ofviolations ofFederal laws in Canada. Nonetheless, an
American study by Fortune magazine (reported by Clinnard Marshall 1990) reveals
that the phannaceutical industry has "racked up a far worst record ofFederal law
violations than any other industry except oil and automotive." S2 It is "involved in 1
out of every 10 cases of violations, and 1 in 8 cases of serious violations," which
also includes the making ofunsafe products in the U.S. "One out of 10 of all the
penalties the government imposed on large corporations for serious violations were
so. Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager. Corporate Crime. (London: The Free Press, 1980.)
p-262.
Sl ·b·d
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S2. Clinard and Yeager. op. cit. p-62
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levied on the phannaceutical industry. "53 The study also reported that one
corporation alone had violated federal laws 21 times within a two-year duration.
The phannaceutical industry prides itself as an ethical industry charged with
the responsibility of saving lives. However, the process of accountability, honesty
and integrity is very much to be desired. Of great concern to many are the number of
cases of fraud and falsification of data on clinical trials, false infonnation provided
by drug companies and the hiding and misrepresenting of dangerous effects of drugs
that are sold on the market. (see examples below) It is not possible to relate all or
rank in importance the number of cases ofviolations that have been reported since
there are so many to choose from. Given the present conditions under which drugs
are manufactured and promoted, it is very difficult to detect fraud and falsification
of data provided by drug companies. Drug companies are often found guilty of
withholding important infonnation on effects of a drug that is vital to the life of the
patient as the following example proves:
53. ibid., p-56
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In early July 1978, an ambulance rushed June Froman to a hospital in New
York City. Froman, a patient ofDr. Jerome Rotstein, had been tested for a
severe case of arthritis with an experimental drug called 'Sudoxican,
manufactured by Pfizer Company. Rotstien was supposed to be monitoring
Froman's use of Sudoxian carefully in late June and early July, and was
supposed to report any unusual reactions to federal officials. Instead of
conducting monitoring tests, however, Rotstein went on vacation in Europe.
By the time he returned, Froman had already been admitted to the hospital,
her liver dissolved by sudoxican. "In no way could she be saved, no matter
what we did for her," Rotstein told FDA officials later. But Rotstein pointed
the finger ofblame for death at Pfizer Company officials, claiming they hid
the ~g's serious adverse effects from him and tried to convince him not to
report the death to Federal authorities. "It is a killer drug." Rotstein said. "I
killed a patient because I didn't know the drug caused hepatic toxity. I was
led down a blind alley by people who should have known better." Alerted by
the news ofFroman's death, FDA investigators reviewed reports that Pfizer
had submitted to the FDA. Strangely these reports included results,
purportedly from Froman's case, recorded up to several days before her
hospitalization, that showed "essentially nonnal clinical studies." After
investigators examined the clinical studies closely they found that Rotstein
had been out of the country and had never done any of the studies. If Froman
had not died, the FDA might well have accepted the falsified Sudoxican tests,
and millions ofAmericans could have been exposed to her fate. S4
The dilemma of suppression of facts by drug companies is a r~pant practice
which .has reached alanning proportions; fortunately for consumers the drug
Sudoxican was not launched on the market. However there are many other drugs
whose effects are known to drug companies but have not been revealed to the
relevant state regulatory bodies. A good example in point was a confession by Eli
Lilly to the British Parliament and American Congress that it knew of the dangers of
its anti-arthritic drug Opren, before it was launched in the U.S. It killed 74 patients
54 B · h· · 54
. ralt waite, Ope Cit. p- .
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in Britain, 15 months before the drug was withdrawn from the market. (Sunday
Times, 27 February 1983) One year before its withdrawal, an investigator for F.D.A
recommended that criminal charges be brought against Eli Li~ly for failing to report
65 of 173 adverse reactions on four brands of drugs submitted by doctors including
Opren. Yet Eli Lilly continued to market the drug. (Wall Street Journal, 4 August
1983).55
Drug companies are not only guilty ofwithholding vital information to the
public, but doctors under the payroll of these companies to monitor safety tests are
also culpable as well. According to the F.D.A, between 1977 and 1980, 62 doctors
were found to have submitted falsified or'incorrect clinical data to the
organization.56 It is alleged that drug companies purposefully hire doctors whom
they think can easily manipulate tests results to get F.D.A approval. Between 1971
to 1978, Dr. Ronald Smith was hired by six drug companies including Sandoz,
Upjohn and Cyanamid to carry out tests on about a do~en psychotropic drugs.
Luckily, according to an F.D.A scientist, an office assistant reported that "the way
the doctor got the pill count to come out correct was to count the correct number of
pills the patient should have taken and then flush them down the toilet. ,,57
The job of the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S., is made more
55 Braithwaite. Ope cit. p-56
56. ibid., p-53
57. Braithwaite. op.cit. p-53
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difficult in tracking down alleged irregularities by doctors working on behalf of drug
companies to carry out research. Attempts by the F.O.A to investigate some
physicians on the quality of data they have submitted for approval for new drugs
have resulted in unexplained calamities. For example, Dr. James Scheiner who
works on behalf of Johnson and Johnson had his office broken into on the eve of an
F.O.A investigation. All his records related to his research to be audited were
thrown in his whirlpool bath. Before his next scheduled FOA audit, his office was
set on fire. Another doctor Francois Savery "accidentally" dropped his statistics
collected for Hoffman-La Roche and other companies overboard while in a boat
when he was infonned of an impending F.D.A. investigation.58
It is alleged that phannaceutical companies put immense direct and indirect
pressure on outside laboratories and specialists to give them commendatory test
results. Orug companies are anxious to get their drugs on the market and therefore
select laboratories interested in making profits and which will give them favourable
results. Any unfavourable submission of results would mean the loss of future
contracts.59 Consequently, the falsification of data to prove positive results is a
regular practice ~ong commerciallaboratories.6o Another appalling drug testing
fraud involved Mer/29, a drug designed to reduce blood cholesterol by Richardson-
S8 ·b·d
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Merrill. The company submitted to the F.O.A that tests were carried out
successfully on over 300,000 patients before approval was granted. Months later
patients were complaining ofbaldness, changes to blood and reproductive organs
and serious damages to eyes and skin. According to Marshall Clinard "it turned out
that when test monkeys, dogs, and rats became ill or died, test supervisors ordered
testing personnel to change the test data and even to substitute healthy animals for
the sick group,"61 as a ploy to deceive the F.O.A. The result from this deliberate
deception was the sickness and suffering of thousands ofpatients who later died.
Similarly, when G.O. Searle was charged for fraud and incompetence in 1970 for
the false testing of Aldactone, Flagyl and Norplace, the company admitted to a
grand jury trial that "while there might have been a little dishonesty here and there,
basically it was a problem of incompetence and poor recording among our research
staff. ,,62
In the 1960's perhaps one ofhistory's most despicable drug disasters occurred
despite warnings that the drug Thalidomide, prescribed to help prevent nausea in
pregnant women, could cause malfonnations in the foetuses. As a result more than
10,000 babies were born limbless and crippled. Nonetheless, the manufacturers,
Merrell company, maintained that the drug was safe despite overwhelming evidence
to the contrary until the worldwide birth defects reached alanning proportions in
61 ·b·d
° 1 1 0'
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Europe and North America. The drug was eventually withdrawn from the European
markets in 1961 but was not taken off the shelves of Canadian phannacies until one
year later.63
The incompetence and corruption practiced by drug companies have similar
ramifications for Canadian consumers, since not all drugs approved by the F.D. A
are retested here in Canada. In 1992 in a bid to 'hannonize' Canadian testing policy
with the U.S., the Conservative government announced new measures to speed up
the approval ofnew drugs by reducing the participation of its own experts.
Responsibilities for the reviews of over 100 new drugs were handed over to private
consultants; most of whom have worked with some drug companies involved. This
favourable shift in policy from the stand point of drug companies came after years of
lobbying by the industry who complained of long waiting periods to get their drugs
approved. According to Health Minister Benoit Bouchard, the aim of the policy was
to reduce the approval process from four to six years to about six to twelve months.
The government's decision came in the wake of a study conducted by the U.s.
General Accounting Office on ten years of drug review of the F.D.A, which
revealed that "drugs with serious post-approval risks had a shorter approval time
than drugs without such risks." Between 1976 and 1985, the study found that 102 of
198 drugs approved by the F.D.A had "serious post-approval risks." Some of these
63. Lexchin., op.cit. p-193
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drugs were later approved by Canadian authorities here in. As a consequence the
F.D.A called for stronger reviews and brought to attention the case ofDow Coming,
manufacturers of silicone breast implants. Internal documents released by Dow
Corning revealed that the company knew since the mid-1970's that its implants
would leak.
Previously, reviews ofproposed new products were conducted by the Health
and Welfare Department's protection branch based on infonnation submitted by
drug companies and the F.D.A. Now these reviews are given to private researchers
"some ofwhom also receive fees from drug manufacturers for conducting research."
The safety of Canadian drugs is now compromised and according to Joseph
Valadares, a HPB phannacologist with 22 years experience, "We're getting a higher
percentage ofpositive reviews from outside reviewers" For Sari Tudiver of the
Winnipeg Women's Health Clinic "Drug approval in Canada is [now] a closed
process. It includes the drug industry but no consumer input. ,,64
Profits, Prices and Power of Influence
There is much ambiguity and tension between the role of the industry as
guardians of the public's health and its emphasis on the maximization ofprofits. The
public pays billions of dollars for phannaceutical drugs through inflated prices often
beyond the reach for those who really need them. Yet it has been calculated that in
64. Note all the above quotations and information on this topic are taken from the Globe
and Mail. "Is drug policy pushing the limits. Ottawa draws fire for seeking to speed producers'
approval." February 25, 1992. p-Al,A6
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any given year the same public are the big losers since they cannot be guaranteed
they will be cured.
Phannaceutical drug companies are ranked among the most profitable
industries in the world. In 1991, while other American industries were experiencing
declining profits in the United States, phannaceutical companies earned 15 to 20
percent more than the previous year. For every dollar invested by the industry it was
making 26 'cents profit which is twice the rate ofreturn compared to all other of
Fortune's 500 industries. Their fmancial perfonnance exceeded the perfonnance of
the auto sector by twenty-six times, oil and publishing by three and two times
respectively.65 While individual drug companies have also been making record
profits, Merck & Co, the world's largest phannaceutical company, earned forty-six
cents profits out of every dollar invested.66 According to Drake and Uhlman, there is
no other business in the U.S. that consistently makes such enonnous profits despite
the economic situation.67 In 1990, American. consumers spent some $67 billion on
prescription drugs. It was estimated that their prices increased at three times the rate
of inflation in the 1980's -a 152 percent increase.68 According to Roxanne Snider,
American-based drug. companies earned profits of 15.5 percent on sales compared
6S. Drake and Uhlman, Ope cit. p-5
66. ibid., p-6
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Vol.23 Number 2, 1993. (New York: Baywood Publishing Co, Inc) p-264
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to an average of 4.6 percent for other major based industries, while the 20 highest
paid executives in the United States work in the drug industry with an average
salary between $5.8 and $8.4 million a year.69
Excessive profits breed power and authority within the American decision
making process because much more money can be spent freely among key
congressional figures. It is argued that "nothing happens on Capital Hill affecting the
drug industry without the input-some say resistance-of the Phannaceutical
Manufacturers'Association. ,,70 For Sen. David Pryor, (Democrat-Arkansas) the
American drug industry "is more feared than respected by Congress,"'! and is
ranked along with the National Rifle Association and the American Medical
Association as the most powerful lobbying organization in the U.S. Industry main
lobby group the PMA, operates a few blocks away from the White House in
Washington while its counterpart in Canada, the PMAC, locates its offices a few
blocks away from Parliament Hill and the Prime Minister's office.
It is estimated that as much as $31 million U.S. is spent annually to run the
PMA in the U.S. According to Drake and Ulhman there is no legislative hearing in
the U.S. that has a bearing on the drug industry without the attendance of an official
from the PMA. Industry's officials are always anned with the latest industry-
69. Roxanne Snider. "Patents and Profits." New Internationalist." August 1993. p-20
70. Drake and Uhlman, op.cit. p-40
71. Novac, op.cit. p-263
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generated statistics that disseminate basically the same old argument that their
counterparts in Canada similarly use for example that
prescription drugs are cost-effective, account for only 7 percent ofmedical
care costs in this country, and shouldn't come under too much regulation. It
costs $231 million to bring a drug to market, and the industry has to make a
sizable profit to reward its investors for taking risks.72
Between 1981 to 1991, according to a study conducted by public advocacy group
Common Cause, the industry spent $8 million through its political action committees
on some key members of Congress and Senate73 in ex~hange for their support for
greater international intellectual property rights. This period is perhaps one of the
most eventful in the history of the industry as we will see in chapter 3.
Drug companies are known to have friends in the highest places of the
American decision making process. The American government with the direct help
ofPresident Reagan and Vice-President Bush, later President Bush, and with:finn
support from key supporters of the industry in Congress and the Senate were able to
put pressure on the Canadian government to"rescind its drug patent laws in 1987 and
1992. The drug industry boosted some top and most influential figures in American
policy making, including George Bush, himself a fonner employee of the industry.74
Reagan's top trade adviser at the time was the Chainnan ofPfizer, Edward Pratt,
72. Drake and Uhlman, op.cit. p-41
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who ·spearheaded the industry's campaign within the White House until Canada
acceded to the changes demanded by the industry.
Marketing, Advertising and Promotion
The marketing strategy by phannaceutical companies is yet another
contentious issue that has been brought to attention by many critics of the industry.
It is essential to make a clear distinction between the production and marketing of
phannaceuticals and those of other products because of their complex healing
qualities and serious phannacological effects. We have already linked the problem
of safety of drugs and corrupt practices·of the drug industry.
The situations in which patients use drugs can be adequately detennined by
phannaceutical manufacturers with sufficient infonnation on side effects, risks and
benefits. However, these judgements are not made by the patient but by trained and
highly skilled professionals who act as an intennediary between the manufacturers
and patients. The fact that it is not the end user that detennines the usage and safety
of a drug but an intennediary signifies a special relationship between the industry,
practitioner and patient. This relationship by and large should adhere to the strictest
professional standards under careful state regulatory controls in the best interest of
the consumer, but suffice to say this is not so.
The past history of the industry demonstrates little regard for the lives of
consumers and the relationship between doctors and patients has always been
circumspect. Of great concern to many is the massive sale, promotion and
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misleading advertising ofpsychotropic drugs such as antidepressants and
tranquilizers to. Many are led to believe that there is a 'miracle' pill out there for
every single conceivable problem they face, from stress, depression, tiredness,
sleeplessness, to baldness. Drug companies would like consumers to know that the
solutions to these problems are very simple, Just simply pop a pill and forget your
worries.'
The application of scientific and technical expertise in the development of
psychotropic drugs as 'cures for all problems', can be described as an attempt to
make innocent humans feel that
human behaviour, and a growing range of social deviance, is best
accounted for in tenns of the biological fundamentals of cellular and
molecular functioning. Allied to this is a perception of the human body
-including the mind-as a machine with relatively interchangeable and
standardized components that are responsive to intervention.7s
The introduction ofpsychotropic drugs has its origins during the 1920's and 30's
when drug companies promoted cocaine-laced capsules and heroin-based products
as a fonn of drug therapy for the sick. Most importantly the success of the sale of
these products encouraged the development of tranquilizers and antidepressants for
legitimate consumption. Significantly their introduction into the market paved the
way for the transfonnation ofphannaceuticals "into areas of social intervention and
7S. Peter Davis. "Pharmaceutical and Public Policy." in For Health or Profit, ed by Peter
Davis. (Auckland, Melbourne and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p-7 and 8.
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behaviour modification,"76 which "subtly transfonns social 'problems' into individual
and personal 'solutions'. ,,77
Sales for these types of drugs such as Valium, prosac, sleeping gels etc., are
heavily promoted through visits by promotional agents ofphannaceutical companies
to doctors. The sale for example of Valium in the United States has accounted for
33 million prescriptions being filled at cost of $293 million for the year 1980.78
Promotional campaigns by drug companies are deliberate and misleading to doctors
who become victims of a conspiracy to deceive patients about the therapeutic value
of drugs for the sake ofprofits.
The following quotation from an American subsidiary based in Canada, Mead
Johnson, proves to what extent drug companies would go to mislead patients and
yet confmn their actions.
By means of overwhelming promotional techniques the public has been
made to believe that drugs such as sedatives, narcotics, antipyretics,
skeletal muscle relaxants, anti-spasmadoics, etc. possess unique
tranquilizing activities. These drugs do indeed posses unique
phannacological activities but tranquillization is not one such activity.79
This deception is hardly an accident but yet another deliberate ploy which is
76. Davis. op.cit. p-7 and 8
77 ·b·d
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79. quoted by Hon. William D. Howe (Hamilton South) in House of Commons Debates.
February 12, 1968. p-6643
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consistently being used to deceive consumers.
Phannaceutical corporations in Canada are known to spend as much as 30
cents out of every.dollar in advertising on promotion to doctors. Fortune magazine
points out that the·brand name industry spends twice as much on sales and
marketing as it does on research and development.8o Besides the glossy colourful
journals and magazines written by company executives that are distributed free to
doctors, drug companies organize "continuing education" seminars in out of town
locations with all expenses paid as a way ofmarketing their products. Some doctors
are given promotional gifts such as computers and expense free vacations depending
on how much brand name drugs they prescribe. In 1989 Squib Canada gave
computers to doctors who prescribe its drug Capoten to 10 or more patients.81 Each
year multinational· drug companies spend "over $750 million a year on lobbying,
advertising and promotions to influence the kind of treatment you receive [while]
they spend $385 million on research. ,,82 Allegedly the process of deceiving patients
starts from medical schools where interns are taught only a basic course in
phannacology. Therefore they are likely to be influenced by drug companies who
distribute "textbooks with lustrous graphics and a free stethoscope"83 to all students.
80. Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell. Take .back the Nation (Toronto:Key Porter Books
Ltd, 1993.) p-107
81. Toronto Star. "Drug firms spend lavishly to push products." September 4, 1993. p-B5.
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Against this background, access to drugs and medical treatment should be
based on "social judgements ofbenefit-improvements in health-rather than just
intrinsic profitability.u84 Given the role of the state in the provision offree health
care, greater control and regulation is required to make sure that the drug industry is
responsive and responsible to the needs of the public. The practice of spending huge
sums ofmoney on promotional campaigns to gain brand name loyalty compromises
the safety of consumers and contributes to the high cost ofmedicines. Oligopoly
within the industry, therefore, should not be perpetuated by fostering dependence of
members of the medical community on infonnation provided by the drug industry,
rather the supply of cheaper brands ofmedicines through generic competition should
he the alternative.
Conclusion
The development of a state public policy on the phannaceutical industry
should not be considered in isolation from the issues raised during this chapter. An
analysis on the merits of greater intellectual property protection and its dire financial
consequences for health care, the sick and needy is only one aspect of the argument.
The other is the industry's role in the provision ofmedical care to the community.
Yet it seems from the industry's perspective that the only issue of concern to it is the
fight for greater intellectual property protection through state protection from
84. Davis, op. cit. p-2 and 3
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competition. The industry has skilfully managed to deflect the concerns and issues
raised in this chapter throughout the debate on Bill C-91 because of the
intransigence ofpolicy makers, the media and the facilitatory role and support by
the state.
51.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical analysis of State, Public Policy and Dependency Theory
General Introduction
The state in contemporary society and public policy is the focus of fierce
debate and analysis that varies according to one's political and ideological beliefs. It
is one of the most complex and pervasive institution of our times since it affects the
interests ofmany people as a result of one's social, political, economic and class
background. The state according to Ralph Miliband is a system of institutions -- the
government, the bureaucracy, the military, police, the judiciary, sub-central
government and parliamentary assemblies. 1 Some liberal theorists also interpret the
state as an institution organised with the goal ofreconciling and mediating inherent
antagonisms among various groups. The functions of these institutions and their
interrelationship fonn the basis of the state system. In order to facilitate a clear
understanding of the role of the state in public policy it is necessary to examine the
relation between the political and state system.
Since, as Miliband indicates, the state is a system of institutions, an analysis
of the distribution ofpower and its relationship between individuals and institutions
is important. Power is defined as the authority and capability to make decisions by
institutions and individuals that affect the lives of others through the ability of
1. Ralph Miliband The State in Capitalist Society. (London: Quartet Books, 1973) p. 46-
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putting these decisions into effect. This is also a crucial element of understanding
the political and state systems. The political system includes political parties, trade
unions, associations, interest groups and also non... p·olitical organizations that are
very influential, such as the media, churches and business.2 These institutions wield
considerable power, authority and influence within the state and the policy process
to satisfy their own interests.
Whatever the state does, it is individuals who are most affected by its actions.
The prevalence of the state represents the pivot ofpolitical organizations of society
where every aspect ofhuman life from birth to death is regulated and controlled to
some extent.3 The rampant growth of state intervention and regulatory control over
humans contribute to the strengthening of power and authority of the state. Failing to
come to grips with the state and to obey its laws would be a threat to the state itself
and to the existence ofpower and authority of its institutions. The state therefore to
exist, as Weber stated, must "successfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate use
ofphysical force within a given territory. ,,4 Which other institution can be called
upon to realize this task, other than the police and military in the preservation of
law, order and peace? The state exercises authority and power which tends to
2. ibid., p-47
3. Christopher Ham and Michael Hill. Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. (New
York: St. Martin Press, 1984) p-23.
4. Miliband, Ope cit. p-47.
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isolate it from the people. It also uses less authoritative means through coercion,
exhortation and threats to secure compliance with its demands.
Ideological Perspectives of the State.
Another important aspect of the state is the role it plays in the production of
ideology in modern day society. The tenn "ideology" is often confused and
misunderstood in tenns ofwhat it is or what it is not. The lack of appreciation of its
importance can severely restrict our ability to analyze and comprehend the role of
the state in the policy process. Defining this problem is no guarantee that we can
solve it, given the inherent class structure, divergent interests, power and influence
ofvarious social groups. Ideology represents a totality of ideas, assumptions,
beliefs, explanations, values and opinions on how we are supposed to perceive our
social-natural relations and environment. This will no doubt have an impact on our
perception ofpolitics and the role of the state. Obviously, political science is not
only the empirical study of the distribution ofpower in society; it is concerned with
the practical involvement in conflicting social institutions. It is important to
understand that this correlation not only affects the structure of the state but also the
activities of the political and state systems in the fmal detennination of public
policy.
In this context we understand ideology, in the sense used by Marx, as the
rationalization of economic exploitation, political domination, social discrimination
and human alienation and, as an inaccurate, out-of-focus, inadequate superstructural
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reflection ofworld capitalist material production, economic relations and forces of
production.S According to Marx, state ideology deliberately distorts reality to serve
dominant class interests in public policy. The role of ideology, but more importantly
political ideology, is significant in understanding the content and direction of the
political and economic policy of the state and its institution as well as the political
behaviour of the masses. Political ideology therefore can be understood as a system
of beliefs about what role the state should play in society as perceived by some class
or groUp.6
A particular ideological perspective is the result of an elusive and almost
impenetrable process ofpolitical socialization in the interest of the status quo or
dominant class. The agents of this process are the government, political parties, the
media, the educational system, for example, schools and universities, the family,
peers and the workplace. They help to pattern and shape policy in the interests of
the dominant ideology that seeks to maintain the dominant role of existing
institutions.
Theories of the State.
As stated before, the state is the focus of a continuing debate and analysis as
to its character, role and purpose in a capitalist society. Ralph Miliband describes
S. Franz J.T. Lee Theoria-Praxis de la Revolucion-Emancipacion. (Merida:
CDCHTlFacultad Forestal, Universidad de los Andes, 1989) p-86
6. A. P Sheptulin Marxists Leninist Philosophy. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980)
pp.420-424.
53
the theory of the state as a "theory of society and the distribution ofpower in that
society. ,,7 An analysis of the distribution ofpower in society is fundamental to
understanding of the role of the state in policy-making. Many theoretical
perspectives have been outlined from time to time on the role and function of the
state in policy-making and ultimately why and who benefits? Ofparticular
importance to our analysis of Canadian public policy are the Pluralist, Marxist and
Elite theories.
Pluralist Theory Of The State.
Pluralism is based on the idea that the nature and distribution of state power
is dispersed and divided into a number of groups rather than centralized. The
pluralist theory views the state as an 'honest broker' that serves as a neutral body to
make decisions in the best interests of all groups of society. However, according to
Alford and Friedland, rarely is the expression "state" used by pluralist theorists,
instead, many prefer to use tenns such as "political system," (Easton 1965) "political
community," (De Grazia 1948) "polity," (Long 1962) or "pluralist system."
(McFarland 1969)8 This preference is based on the premise that suggests diverse
sources of authority within the state, based on open and accessible government
institutions. The interests of state institutions are fragmented and are often
7. Miliband. op.cit. p. 4-5
8. Robert Alford and Roger Friedland Powers of Theory, Capitalism, the State and
Democracy. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p-41
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positioned against one another; therefore little attention is placed on the role of the
state and more on the political system which is regarded as the source of
competition among interest groups.
The primary function of the state according to pluralism is to serve as a
neutral arbitrator to aggregate choices and to integrate differing opinions to build
consensus and compromises in the policy process. Pluralists have argued that the
nature and development ofmodeTIl industrial societies have contributed to the
specialization and differentiation ofnew occupations, professions and groups with a
particular interest to protect and promote. As a result different groups and
organisations are fonned to articulate and represent their specific concerns, needs
and interests within the policy process. These groups are known as interest groups.
The notion is that there is strength in numbers and those who join together can apply
pressure on the decision makers or the public as a whole to reach decisions that are
in their interests. Pluralism, therefore, argues that the modeTIl state is a system of
power designed to encourage competition within the policy process through
bargaining and compromise among various groups.
The assumption therefore of the pluralist theory is that groups are fonned to
influence the state, but this says nothing about their effectiveness in representing
their members. Not all groups possess the same economic power and resources to
influence government and therefore some are excluded from the decision making
process. Moreover some individuals do not be~ong to groups hence they too are
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excluded. This means that decisions are made without the full participation and
input of all. E.E. Schattschneider notes in a popularly cited passage that, "The flaw
in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class
accent. ,,9 This upper class accent can be attributed to the huge financial resources
possessed by certain groups, especially business, for example the Business Council
on National Issues, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian
Manufacturers Association and the Phannaceutical Manufacturers Association of
Canada. These resources can be used to hire lawyers, public relation experts, public
policy specialists and lobbyists to represent their interests not only to the state but to
the public.
Here in Canada the basic source ofpower which serves as a breeding nest for
influencing policy is between the political executive, (cabinet and the bureaucracy)
since Parliament is closely controlled by the government in power and political
parties. Nevertheless the implication of the pluralist approach to policy making is
that the state is basically democratic and all interests are equally represented
through the policy process.
Joseph Schumpeter in his book Capitalism, Socialism and DemocracylO sees
the goals for political office as a competition between elites for the votes of the
9. E. E. Schattschneider The Semisovereign People (Hisdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press,
1960) p. 34-35
10. Joseph Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1943)
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masses. This scenario operates within the ambit of a market where the voters are
perceived to be like consumers who have the option of choosing -the best policies
[products] among the competing political parties [sellers]. The significance of this
analysis is that the policy-making process within government is dominated by
competing elites who to some extent have to be responsive to popular demands or
risk being replaced by other competing elites. Therefore in Raymond Aron's words
"government becomes a business of compromise. "11
But even according to Dahl, a noted defender of pluralism, the making of
government decisions "is the steady appeasement of relatively small groups. Even
when these groups add up to a numerical majority at election time it is usually not
useful to construe that majority as more than an arithmetic expression. ,,12 A good
example in point is that despite the overwhelming reaction and evidence against Bill
C-91, the Conservative government still maintained that it was in the best interests
of all Canadians to pass the legislation.
This action amply explains the role of the state in the p~licy process which,
according to many, favours the interests of business. Charles Lindblom, for example
in his work Politics and Markets,I3 acknowledges that because of greater economic
11. Raymond Aron "Social Class, Political Class", in Bendix and Lipset, ed. Class, Status
and Power. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1967) p-208
12. Robert Dahl A Preface to Democratic Theory. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1950) p-234
13. Charles Lindblom Politics and Markets. (New York: Basic Books, 1977)
:
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resources and lobbying ability the interests ofbusiness are given a "privileged
position," in the policy process. According to him, large corporations "command
more resources than do most government units. They can also, over a broad range,
insist that government meet their demands, even if these demands run counter to
those of citizens expressed through their polyarchal controls. "14 William Coleman in
his book Business and Politics notes that the notion ofpluralism "distorts and hides
what actually occurs in practise." According to him," There is a systematic bias in
the Canadian system, which consistently gives the business community a better
hearing and considers its demands and proposals more seriously when policies are
being designed. "15 Theodore Lowi offers a different perspective by noting that the
policy process is "biased not so much in favour of the rich as in favour of the
established and organised. "16 But he also recognises that the interests ofbusiness
dominate the policy process since it is in the mutual interests of the state and
business to have stability that would facilitate their perfonnance. Despite this
recognition by some analysts of the political power ofbig business, the pluralist
belief is in sharp contrast to the Marxist analysis which suggests that society is an
inevitable product of an antagonistic class division, based on historic social, political
14. ibid., p-356
IS. William Coleman Business and Politics: A study ofCollective Action (Montreal: Mc
Gill- Queen's University Press, 1988) p-3
16. Theodore Lowi The End ofLiberalism. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979) p-280
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and economic exploitation. According to Marxists, this division is held in check by
an authoritative hegemonic state that facilities its survival through coercion and
consent.
Marxist theory of the state.
According to Marxian analysis, the state is not an "honest broker" or a neutral
body that makes decisions for the benefit of all, rather it is an instrument of class
domination. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx wrote "The executive of the modem
state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole
bourgeoisie. "17 This statement by Marx can be appreciated from an analysis of the
economic, social and political functions of the modern class state.
The essence ofMarxian theory roots itself in the relationship between the
owners of the means of production and the producers ofwealth, the workers. The
workers are forced to sell their labour power at a cost detennined by the capitalist
and not by how much the worker feels he or she is worth. This unequal relationship
provides the basis for political antagonism between the social classes and the
foundations for the existence of the capitalist state. The purpose of the state is
therefore to defend and protect the interests of the owners ofprivate property
(dominant classes) vis-a-vis the workers (the dominated classes). The existence of
private property has shaped the role and function of the state and without its
17. Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels The Communist Manifesto. (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1950) p-20
59
existence the fundamental base of the state will be radically changed.
According to Marx and Engels, the primary political purpose of the state is to
serve the needs of the dominant class. The political structure, the state, is designed
to organize the necessary conditions for economic exploitation and political
domination backed by a coercive apparatus. The state helps to mediate class
conflicts; it has a social function in so far as it fosters an ideology to rationalize and
veil its real political and economic functions. Generally this ideological function is
materialized within the framework of the intellectual production of social nonns and
behaviour patterns for example within the ambit of schools, universities, the mass
media, but also through religious bodies, especially the church, to encourage
docility and obedience through consent and coercion. The state socially nurtures
discrimination against the dominated classes for example by applying its own
principle of "divide and rule." The state, through policies, programs and projects
forces the dominated classes to affirm the ruling class structure, the status quo, so as
to get the dominated classes to forget their own class demands and interests. 18
After Marx, a number ofMarxist theorists have also helped to develop a
Marxian theory of the state. Ralph Miliband in The State in Capitalists Societyl9 has
demonstrated evidence of a linkage between business and the state and how much
business has benefited from state intervention in the economy through formation of
18. Lee, op.cit. Chapter 3-5
19 Mil·b d ·
. . 1 an , 0p.Clt.
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the Welfare State. According to him the state is simply an instrument of class rule,
which continually facilitates the centralization and concentration of capital and as a
result the concentration ofpower within the capitalist society in the hands of a few.
Miliband also shows the effects of the ideological congruence of elements of the
govenunent, administration, military, judiciary and other agencies in alliance with
businesses. Nicos Poulantzas, described as a structuralist critic, differed from
Miliband's analysis of the state. According to him the state still has considerable
autonomy from the business class and as a result is able to quell rivalries and
conflicts within the capitalist class. Personal ties and ideological congruence may be
coincidental and do not matter much.20
James O'Connor also offers another approach to the study ofMarxian theory
of the state. In his analysis of The Fiscal Crisis of the State,21 he describes what he
sees as the main functions of a capitalist state, namely accumulation and
legitimation. According to him, the dominant class depends on the state to create the
conditions for the accumulation of capital by investing in the building of the
economic infrastructure . O'Connor feels that the legitimizing function of the state is
necessary in order to preserve social hannony in the midst of deep-rooted class
antagonism and conflicts. The state must demonstrate its legitimacy to the working
class by appearing to take an interest in their problems by investing in social
20. Nicos Poulantzas Political Power and Social Class. (London: Verso Publications, 1973)
21. James O'Connor The Fiscal Crisis of the State. (New York: St. Martin Press, 1973)
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expenditures and social welfare.
Elitist Theory of State.
Central to the elite theory of the state is the argument that a small minority
has the power, influence and authority to bar the rest of the population from access
to the decision-making process. However, elitists do not believe that political power
is necessarily based on control of the economy, although it may be. Elite is a
political nomenclature that differs from the Marxists economic tenn 'class' and also
challenges the pluralist analysis that power is dispersed among a large segment of
the population.
A number of classical elite theorists such as Mosca and Pareto have
concluded that it is inevitable for state power to be dominated by a small minority.
They also argue that it is natural and necessary for there to be a 'power elite' in any
society given the fact that any group that attains political power would inevitably try
to consolidate its own power base and privileges. Mosca for example states
In all societies -- from societies that are meagrely developed and have barely
attained the drawings of civilization, down to the most advanced and
powerful societies--two classes ofpeople appear-- a class that rules and a
class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, perfonns all
political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power
brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and
controlled by the fITst, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more
or less arbitrary and violent.22
For Pareto, society is also made up of two classes ofpeople, they are 1. "the lower
22. Gaetano Mosca The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939) p-50
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stratum, the non elite... and 2. the upper stratum, the elite class. "23 Inevitably the
upper stratum will he the rulers of society because of superior education, intellect
and biological abilities.
In the post-second World War period, C. Wright Mills in a study of the
United States, concluded that the most influential decision makers in the American
political system are made up of the very top echelons of society. They display the
same social and educational backgrounds and are often biologically linked to one
another. They also occupy the most important positions in govennnent, business and
the military and are able to manipulate and control the masses for their own
interests. Leaders of these institutions, because of their link to one another, are able
to create a coherent power elite to protect their interests.24
Modern day elite analysis draws a special link between the state and business
elites. The state elites are dependent on the business elites for their survival in
financial support through taxes, job creation and investments. A failure of the
economy will undennine the ability of the state to survive economically. Although
studies by Porter and Clement have concluded that there are competition and some
differentiation among- state and business elites in Canada, they have also indicated
that elites are all disproportionately recruited from the upper class and share the
23. Vilfredo Pareto Sociological Writings (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976) p. 248-249
24. C. Wright Mills The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950)
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same set of biases in making decisions in their favour. 2S Elites, therefore, are the
crucial gatekeepers of society who exercise control, power and influence over the
political and state system. Subsequently other studies by Robert Presthus and Jorge
Niosi have focused their attention on the social and ethnic background of state and
business elites.26 They arrived at similar findings to that ofPorter and Clement
which demonstrate a great sympathy for the upper class in the decision making
process. These findings are significant in understanding the nature of democracy and
policy making in Canada.
Given our analysis of the theories of the state we would now attempt to
analyze the role of the Canadian state and public policy. We would also examine the
merits of the Dependency Theory and its impact on Canadian!American relations
and public policy.
Canadian State and Public Policy
Throughout the historic economic evolution of Canada, the state has been an
active participant in promoting the development of capitalist relations ofproduction.
The National Policy, for example, was an explicit attempt to facilitate the interests
of the capitalist class ,in Canada. Reg Whitaker describes it as
25. John Porter The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1968) and Wallace Clement Canadian Corporate Elite: An
Analysis ofEconomic Power. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975)
26. Robert Presthus Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: MacMillian
Canada, 1977) and Jorge Niosi Canadian Capitalism: A Study ofPower in Canadian Business
Establishment (Toronto: J.Lorimer, 1981)
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a protectionist national development plan which saw the sponsorship of
an east-west economy linked by a national railway, industrialization
being protected by tariffs, with a captive market in the Western prairie
hinterland which would provide foreign exchange through wheat
exports.27
According to Paul Phillips the major beneficiary of this policy was Central Canadian
capital whose financial interest were so paramount that "even without the goal of
capturing a western frontier the pressure for adopting a protective system would
probably have mounted. "28
Brooks and Stritch argue that prior to the 1878 national election the issue of
laissez-faire versus protectionism was high on the agenda for the business
community.29 Most members of the business community in Central Canada were
vehement in arguing for state support and interference in the market and in favour of
protectionism. The Conservative party led by John A. Macdonald championed the
business initiative during the elections and promptly introduced protectionism after
winning the elections. The intention was the creation of an industri~base in Ontario
and Quebec under protection from American intrusion and competition which it did
"until American capital movements made the tariffs ineffectual as a national
27. Reg Whitaker "Images of the State in Canada in Canada", in The Canadian State,
Political Economy and Political Power. Ed, Panitch, Leo. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1977) p-45
28. Paul Philips "The National Policy", Journal of Canadian Studies. Volume 14, No.3,
1979. p-5
29. Stephen Brooks and Andrew Stritch Business and Government in Canada (Toronto:
Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc. 1991) p-37
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strategy. "30
Jackson and Jackson note that the National Policy "represented the first major
incursion of the state into economic life in Canada. ,,31 But perhaps the unintended
effect of this policy was the rapid domination of the Canadian economy by
American branch plants so much so that Donald Creighton laments that
since the Second World War, while Canadians have been steadily
selling their birthright in order to live in aflluence, Canada has taken on
more and more the characteristic of a branch plant economy.32
Roger Gibbins felt that the National Policy was intended "as a barrier to
goods rather than to capital, it was not designed to keep out American investment,"33
thus the eventual domination of the Canadian economy from capital by the u.s. was
inevitable. By 1960, as Garth Stevenson noted
American interests controlled 44 percent of the capital invested in
Canadian manufacturing, 64 in petroleum, 53 percent in mining and
smelting, while the percentage of capital under Canadian control in
these three sectors of the economy had fallen to 41, 27, and 39 percent,
respectively.34
30 Phil· · 5
. . IpS, op. CIt. p....
31. Robert Jackson and Doreen Jackson Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions,
Behaviour and Public Policy (Toronto: Prentice...Hall Canada, 1990) p...62
32. quoted in Gibbins, Roger. Conflict and Unity, An Introduction to Canadian Political
Life (Toronto: Metheun Publications, 1985) p... 187. Original in Donald Creighton The Passionate
Observer: Selected Writings (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980) p...45
33. Gibbins, op. cit. p...186
34. Garth Stevenson "Federalism and the Political Economy ofthe Canadian State." in
Panitch, op.cit. p-84
66
This historic interventionist role of the Canadian state in favour of the
interests of business clearly served as a severe affiont against the principles of
"laissez-faire" as espoused by the representatives of conservatism and classical
liberalism, a trend that will continue to the 1990's. The idea of "laissez-faire" is
based on a basic postulate, namely the efficiency and effectiveness of the private
market as compared with government intervention in the economy. "Laissez-faire,"
is also "a doctrine that includes a belief in the private ownership ofproperty, in the
rights of individuals to dispose of their property as they so choose, and in the
superiority of the free market as a means for promoting the well-being of individuals
and society as a whole. "35 Yet, as a result of the National Policy there was a
rejection of free trade guided by market principles and the concept of classical
political economy 36 in preference for what John A. Macdonald calls the best interest
of "our national prosperity. ,,37
An important contributory factor to the development of the Canadian state,
and of its interventionist role in favour ofbusiness and regions in public policy, was
from its federal structure. The establishment of Confederation was arguably as a
result of an attempt of the founders to preserve the power and authority of the
emerging economic class of society namely the industrial capitalists and the new
3S. Brooks and Stritch. op.cit. p-28
36. Whitaker, op. cit, p-46.
37. Brooks and Stritch, op. cit. p-38
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emerging "important property owning class" offanners.38 The division ofpowers
between the federal and provincial governments was therefore, linked within the
vision of creating a state as envisaged by the Fathers of Confederation but with
power and authority to realize the dreams of the National Policy. With reason
therefore, the most important function of the state and public policy were in the
realm of its economic role which was "represented by jurisdiction over railways,
shipping, money and banking, the tariff, and major public works were retained in
Ottawa. ,,39 The provinces asswned the responsibility for health, education and
welfare.
One aspect of the economic function of the Canadian state is its role in the
provision of the basic conditions ofproduction which cannot be guaranteed by
members of the private sector. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
role of the state has increased from the provision of defence, trade, foreign policy
and the management of currency to the building of basic infrastructures for private
sector economic development such as roads, railways, bridges, airports, waterways,
and canals.40 The state also provided favourable fiscal and monetary support for the
private sector through capital and fmancial backing to businessmen. According to
38. Stevenson, op.cit, p-74
39. ibid., p-75.
40. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson Crisis, Challenge and Change (Toronto: Methuen
Publications, 1980) p-22
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Panitch it has "underwritten the private risks ofproduction at public expense
through grants, subsidies, fast write-off depreciation allowances, etc. ,,41 However at
the same time according to Moscovitch and Drover "neither economic and social
conditions, the nascent working and professional classes, nor the early social refonn
movements demanded or required significant state intervention for the provision of
social welfare. ,,42 Perhaps this can be attributed, as Jackson and Jackson have
indicated, to "the delayed nature of Canada's industrial revolution; to the weakness
of the working class as an organised political force; to the strength of the business
community in restricting the role of the state to promotion and protection of its own
interests. ,,43 The obvious beneficiaries of state action in the economy were the
dominant and business classes in Canada.
Compared to the state's involvement in the economy on behalf of business,
the state's role in the development of social policies came relatively late and only
after a series of struggles against labour. With the growth of industrialization,
workers increasingly developed a level of class consciousness, encouraged by social
fennent through strikes, lockouts and protests for better working and living
conditions. The state,. despite increasing advocacy and strength from trade unions,
41. Leo Panitch "The Role and Nature of the State. It in Panitch, op. cit. p-14
42. Allan Moscovitch and Glenn Drover "Social Expenditures and the Welfare State: The
Canadian Experience in Historical Perspective", in Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert. (ed) The
Benevolent State (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987) p-17
43. Jackson and Jackson, op.cit, p-63
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social refonners and the women's movement, consistently resisted attempts to
pursue social policies for the bettennent of workers. Coercive measures were often
used to keep the economic system going, by using the military to repress strikes and
demonstrations, deportations ofprogressive leaders and sympathizers ofmovements
and the banning of organisations.44
It was not until continuing struggle and increasing class antagonism between
labour and capital took place that gradual changes were made. The effects also of
the depression and Second World War forced the state into an effort to defuse social
tensions. The state introduced wage freeze and price controls on goods and rent. It
also established crown corporations that were essential to the war-time effort. This
new intervention in the economy after 1940 but with the continued dominance of the
market has sometimes been attributed to the influence ofKeynesianism. It was
argued that Keynes offered a solution to the economic crisis of the 1930's and
provided the basis for government to "construct both a pennanent infrastructure of
programs that would stabilize the economy ... and also strategically alter aggregate
taxing and spending activities to ensure that economic investment and consumer
demand was maintained. "45 State intervention in the economy, as we already noted,
took place from the inception of the National Policy but with the advent of the
44. Moscovitch and Drover, Ope cit, p-27
4S. Bruce Doem and Richard Phidd Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Nelson Canada,
1992) p-137
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depression the role of the state changed by assuming the responsibility to maintain
aggregate demand thus, eliminating the "need for concern over the organisation of
production and supply. ,,46 It is arguable however, whether Keynesian economics was
ever fully practised here in Canada. According to Doern and Phidd the post world
war period of Canada's economic development was undertaken by the Department
ofReconstruction and Defence Production, and later by Trade and Commerce
headed by C.D. Howe. Howe used "tariff and tax policies to encourage foreign
equity investment in Canada, ,,47 which continued the spirit of the National Policy of
reinforcing a branch plant economy.
However, only gradual changes were made over a period of time. The
Workers Compensation Act was introduced in 1920 followed by Old Age Pension
in 1927. But, since the Second World War "health care plans and hospital insurance,
the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, housing policies, grants for higher education
and guaranteed income supplements,,48 were introduced. This new relation or
function of the state is described by James O'Connor as the legitimizing role where
conditions dictate greater social intervention and spending on social programs, to
protect the economic climate for business by assuming the social cost of
46. John Shields and Stephen McBride Dismantling a Nation (Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing, 1993) p-49
47. Doern and Phidd, Ope cit, p-138
48. Jackson and Jackson, Ope cit, p-62
p-238
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production.49 However, according to Stephen Brooks the differences between state
intervention and interference in markets and in social policy is that
the immediate beneficiaries of state intervention are different in the two
cases [families and individuals versus producers] and the welfare state
usually is associated with society's less-privileged elements... In both
cases state intervention has the effect of insulating some part of society
from the unregulated workings of the market.50
The state's interventionist role in the economy was widely accepted by the Canadian
dominant class \yithout much opposition, primarily because it not only nurtured the
stability of capitalism but must preserve and "sustain a capitalism with international
and multinational connections," to their benefit.51
The introduction of a 'Keynesian' approach to management of the Canadian
economy contributed to its growing continental integration through expanded
economic ties with the United States. In the process the Canadian ruling class
became more integrated with the American. This explains the greater influence in
policy making on behalf ofAmerican multinationals in order to maintain their
position "as a supplier of services to both national and multinational corporations. ,,52
According to Garth Stevenson it would be "more useful to think in tenns of a North
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so. Stephen Brooks Public Policy in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc, 1990)
St. Brodie and Jenson, Ope cit. p-220
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American economy than of a Canadian economy,"S3 because of the close proximity
and economic power and influence of the u.s. Since 1945 well over 70 percent of
foreign capital invested in Canada came from the U.S, in addition to an almost
equally large proportion ofU.S.- Canadian foreign trade. s4 American ownership of
the manufacturing sector grew from 35 percent in 1946 to an unprecedented 60
percent in 1963.ss
Dependency Theory and Canadian/American Relations.
George Grant, in his book Lament for a Nation, attributed the American
domination of Canada to the actions of Canadians themselves. According to him
after 1940 it was not in the interests of the economically powerful to be
nationalists. Most of them made more money by being the
representatives ofAmerican capitalism and setting up the branch
plants. No class in Canada more welcomed American managers than
the established wealthy ofMontreal and Toronto,S6
and as a result, the roots of continental integration were established.
American dominance of the Canadian economy is far greater in comparison to
other developed countries. This has contributed to the integration and dependence of
Canada on the u.s economy which can be characterized as a state of economic
S3. Garth Stevenson Unfulfilled Union (3rd edition, Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing
Company, 1989) p-179
S4. Van Gerry Houten Corporate Monopoly (Toronto: Progress Books, 1991) p-119
SS. Brodie and Jenson, op. cit. p-218
S6. George Grant Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1965) p-47
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colonialism. U.S domination has in the process "distorted and retarded Canada's
industrial development and made Canada vulnerable to U.S. economic and political
pressure, ,,57 a factor that was visible in Canada's defence ofAmerican multinationals
in pursuing greater intellectual property rights through GATT and NAFTA. The
American dominance is the source of a great debate among many Canadian political
economists and academics. The central question is to what extent Canada's
dependency on U.S. capital for its technological and economic development
contributed to its subservience to American political power in the decision-making
process?
A popular explanation of this situation is the "dependency theory" approach
which argues that despite Canada's political sovereignty, its economic development
has been retarded because it is too clearly tied to the United States for its industrial
economic development. As a result, Canada is in a position of dependency vis-a-vis
the U.S. and other metropolitan countries. This approach more or less explains why
Canada failed to develop independently an industrial economy free from foreign
dominance. The "dependency theory" inherits its theoretical base from the "staples
thesis" ofHarold Innis and others who argued that Canada's dependence on the
export of staples benefited other industrialized countries while retarding its
industrial and technological progress because of the time and money spent to
S7. Houten, Ope cit. p-119
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develop the infrastructure to support a staple economy.58
A review of some of the works of Canadian political economists and
academics would perhaps help to detennine the validity of this dependency on the
u.s. and its impact on Canadian public policy in relation to American political and
economic influence. Wallace Clement in his book Continental Corporate Power,
argues that as a result of a historic alliance between American and Canadian
capitalists over the past century both have managed to reinforce their power and
influence in the decision-making process to their mutal advantage. Clement views
this relationship as an unequal alliance with American dominance of the productive
sector in Canada with Canadian capitalists relegated to the role of servicing and
expanding the economy in the interests ofAmerican capital.59 This unequal
relationship between the two has resulted in the development of a continental elite
with an objective to protect its own interests. According to him, "Canada cannot be
characterized as an advanced independent capitalist society, nor can it be grouped
with the various peripheral nations often called "the Third World," although it shares
some traits with each type. ,,60
Mel Watkins builds his analysis on Canadian political economy on the basis
S8. For more on the "Staple approach" on the Canadian economy see, Harold Innis The
Political Economy of the Modem State (Toronto: Ryerson, 1946) Harold Innis et. a1. Problems of
staple Production in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1933)
S9. Wallace Clement Continental Corporate Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1977) p-6
60. ibid., p-7
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of the Innisian staples approach. According to him Canada's past dependence on
staples led to the nourishing of an "export mentality, resulting in an over-
concentration of'resources in the export sector and a reluctance to promote domestic
development. ,,61 As a result Canadians became dependent on nations that receive its
exports and those that supply it with manufactured goods. Watkins contends that
Canada's economy is "staple-biased; the industrial structure is truncated and
dependent; the Canadian bourgeoisie is continentalist to the core; the society is
pervasively Americanized," and as a result Canada's economic development is '
constrained to the benefit of the Americans.62
Karl Levitt in her book Silent Surrender described Canada as the "world's
richest underdeveloped country," thanks to the role of Canadian entrepreneurs
whom she depicts as the "coupon clippers and hired vice-presidents of [American]
branch plants today. ,,63 According to her, American multinational domination of the
Canadian economy restricts the autonomy of the Canadian state since American
businesses are not only able to make profits from their investments in Canada but
also to reinvest them to take control of the economy and reinforce Canadian
dependence on American technology. Therefore, "the greater the degree offoreign
61. Mel Watkins "A Staple Theory ofEconomic Growth." Canadian Journal ofEconomics
and Political Science Vol. 29: 1963. p-63
62. Mel Watkins "The Political Economy of Growth", in Wallace, Clement and Williams
Glen, ed. The New Canadian Political Economy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1989) p-31
63. Karl Levitt Silent Surrender (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970) p-40
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ownership and control of Canadian industry, the narrower the freedom of choice in
economic as well as political matters. ,,64 Daniel Drache views Canadian industrial
dependence on the U.S. as a consequence of the "capitalists mode ofproduction"6S
and its past reliance on the staple economy. As a result, Canada's industrial
development has been incomplete. Thus, Canada is caught between two camps of
the world economy: "under-industrialized by imperial interests, but not completely
dependent and sharing many of the social relationships of advanced capitalism. ,,66
Nevertheless, he predicts the eventual collapse of the Canadian economy with its
status being reduced from a "semi-centre economy to a semi-peripheral one. ,,67
Conclusion:
The dependency approach embraced by a number of Canadian academics in
explaining U.s. dominance of the Canadian economy adopts a position based
primarily on nationalistic concerns and on economic disadvantages Canada faces as
a consequence ofpast domestic policies. It also highlights conceDlS about the role of
the Canadian state and its business elites in the nation's industrial development. One
can therefore arrive at the following conclusions: Canadian dependency on the U.s.
64. ibid., p-9
6S. Daniel Drache "Staple-ization: A Theory of Canadian Capitalist Development", in
Heron, Craig, ed. Imperialism, Nationalism and Canada (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1977) p-
16
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67. quoted in Glen Williams "Canada in the International Political Economy", in Clement
and Williams. ed, Ope cit. p-123
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is a social, political and economic problem which is reflected in the Canadian policy
process vis-a-vis the U.S. as a consequence of a disparity ofpower and social
classes between the two countries. It can also be seen as a more complicated
sophisticated process of domination deliberately established by the economic elites
ofboth countries in order to pursue their own economic interests of domination and
control of the Canadian economy. The process of dependency can also be explained
from its internal dynamic which is the creation of what Gary Gereffi calls an
"infrastructure of dependency,"68 that is made up of a number of state institutions,
social classes and processes dedicated to respond to the class interests and
economic needs of the U.s. and Canadian elites.
One effect of Canadian dependency vis-a-vis the U.s. is that the state has no
alternative but to intervene more vigorously on behalf of its branch plant investors,
for example, on behalf ofmultinational drug companies, in order to secure their
investments in an effort to block international competition from other nation-states
for their investments. The state, therefore, becomes part of a process of its own
demise in power, since it becomes embroiled in defence offoreign branch plant
interests rather than protecting its own domestic conceTIlS due to pressures from
economic elites from both sides of the border.
The inherent contradictions and consequences in Canadian dependence on
68. Gary Gereffi The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983) p-22
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American multinationals became visible in the late sixties and early seventies thanks
to the increased militancy and social actions ofmany groups. The pro-nationalist
government ofPierre Trudeau attempted to stem the tide ofAmerican control of
Canadian industry by establishing the Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1974.
Its goal was to screen foreign take-overs of Canadian industries and to make sure
that Canadians benefit from future investments. But the most significant and
controversial action to control foreign dominance of Canadian industry was the
introduction of the National Energy Program in 1980. The goal ofNEP was to
increase the level of Canadian ownership of the oil and gas industry. The reaction to
these policies by the American and Canadian dominant classes was to isolate the
Liberal government and contributed to the arrival of the Conservative alternative of
Brian Mulroney. Finally, our theoretical and public analysis of the state reinforces
the notion that its primary function is to guarantee the economic stability and
environment suitable for investments.
Our analysis has also suggested the weakness of the pluralist theory which
tends to emphasize only the process of decision making but not the consequences
and results of those decisions.
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Chapter 3
Role of the State, multinational corporations and monopoly patent rights
in Canada
General Introduction
On June 23, 1992, the same day the House adjourned for its summer recess, the
Federal Conservative government announced in the House of Commons its intention
to rewrite Canada's patent laws. Minister for Trade and Industry Michael Wilson
introduced the Patent Act Amendment bill (Bill C-91), which would abandon
compulsory licenses by extending monopoly patent rights protection from ten to
twenty years. It would also be retroactive to December 20, 1991, and prohibit
generic companies from exporting their products to other countries. l According to
the government, there would be only a marginal increase in the price of drugs.
Moreover, additional powers would be given to the Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board to control the prices ofpatented medicines. Canadians in the
meanwhile would benefit from a healthier brand name industry which would get the
incentive it needs to produce a wider variety of available drugs, while at the same
time the companies would increase their investments in research and development to
the tune of $500 M over the next five years.
In explaining the reasons for the new patent legislation, Mr. Wilson stated
1. Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association. "Position Paper." (Toronto: CDMA,
September 11, 1992) p-2
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that Canada's previous drug policy, which encouraged cheaper prices through the
production of generic drugs after the expiry of the ten year monopoly patent
protection, "was no longer good for 1992" 2 since "Canada was isolated. "3 He stated
that Bill C - 91 was an inevitable consequence of a new proposal in the draft text of
GATT, which Canada was meeting in advance, to give patent holders the full term
of intellectual protection that is provided in all sectors of our economy. 4 He
admitted however that "we were under tremendous pressure"s from the international
community to strengthen the intellectual protection for medicines, in order to remain
competitive, which is crucial for Canada's future economic prosperity. The
government's initiative will however "attract new investments in a high-technology
industry and enhance Canada's ability to compete for valuable research work and
related jobs." 6
The "tremendous pressure'" which multinational phannaceutical companies
have imposed on Canada to rewrite its intellectual property protection laws for
phannaceuticals is a good example of "what an industry that has its act together can
2. Toronto Star. "Ottawa's drug bill contradicts free trade." June 25, 1992. p-All.
3 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
4. CDMA, Ope cit p-2
s. Toronto Star, June 25, 1992. Ope cit. p-Al1
6. Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Protection. Press Release. June 23, 1992.
7. Toronto Star June 25, 1992. Ope cit. p-All
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do,u8 according to a drug company executive, Edgar Davis. The retroactive date of
December 20, 1991 of the proposed amendment of the Patent Act coincided with
the GATT talks, the same day the Secretary General, Mr. Arthur Dunkel, issued the
organization's new proposals on intellectual property rights. The government has
conceded that as a result, the prices of drugs will increase under Bill C-91.
However, with renewed powers to be given to the Patented Medicine Prices Review
Board all excessive price increases will be challenged.
Historic Evolution of Patent Act, 1969 Legislation
Bill C-91 strikes at the core of the previous successful 1969 Liberal
government strategy, developed as a consequence of three major government
inquiries, which examined allegations that prices for prescription drugs in Canada
were among the highest in the world. Evidence of this had been presented to the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in 1963, the Royal Commission on Health
Services, (known as the Hall Commission) in 1964, as well as to the Special
Committee of the House of Commons on drug costs and prices, (otherwise known
as the Harley committee) in 1967. Each of the three reports identified the extended
20 year patent protection as one of the major reasons why Canadians paid the
highest prices for drugs.9
8. Globe and Mail "Report says drug patent will cost Canadians Billions." November 17,
1992. p-All
9. Gorecki, Paul. Regulating the prices ofprescription drugs in Canada: Compulsory
Licensing, Product Selection and Government Reimbursement Programs. (Toronto:Economic
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It was also revealed that the cost of drugs did not reflect the cost of
production. According to an investigation conducted by the Combines Branch,
stelazine tablets were imported from a parent company in the United States at a cost
of$I.32 cents per 1,000 tablets. Io However, the final selling price for this product to
Canadian phannacies after a deduction of sales tax was $67.70 per 1,000 tablets.
Another example involves the drug trancopal which was imported at $3.88 per
1,000 tablets. After packaging and other costs, the drug was finally sold to Canadian
consumers for $105 per 1,000 tablets. II
According to the director of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in
his 1963 report, the major reason why Canadians pay one of the highest prices for
drugs in the world is because:
the dominance ofbranches and subsidiaries ofUnited States drug finns
and the widespread use in Canada of drug products originated in the
United States mean that drug trade in Canada in effect op·erates under
the United States patent system. Products are patented in the United
States and their prices set on the basis that the patent holders have a
legal monopoly on the sale of these products. Corresponding Canadian
patents are then obtained and the drug is supplied to the Canadian
market .. at least as high a price as that charged in the United StatesI2
Under the Canadian Patent Act, a monopoly is created for a process or
Council ofCanada, 1981.) p-1
10. cited in House of Commons Debates. February 12, 1969, p-6621
11 ·b·d
. 1 1 ., .
12. David Fowler and Gordon Myronj The Drug Industry, A case study ofthe effects of
foreign control on the Canadian economy (Ottawa: Canadian Institute ofEconomic Policy, 1981)
p-37
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patented product to encourage new inventions, change and innovations in "making
the fruits of that invention available in due course to the public." 13 It also gives the
patentee "the p;ower to prevent others from making, using or selling the patented
product or process for a certain period of years." 14 At the expiry of a patent,
multinational drug companies modify their patents by combining the patented drug
with other drugs and make "special preparations like liquids, sprays, creams,
ointments, capsules and intravenous solutions." IS They can also extend the life of a
patented drug by "taking out additional process patents at a later date. "16
In 1923 the Canadian government amended the Patent Act to allow
individuals and companies to apply to the Commissioner ofPatents for a
compulsory license to manufacture a drug under a "process patent." Under Canadian
laws only process patents are granted which means that any two companies can
produce the same drugs without infringing on "each other's patent as long as they
use different processes." 17 However, the Patent Act amendment of 1923 failed to
encourage local competition and the production ofpatented drugs. Section (41) 3 of
13. Hon. John Tumer(Mimster ofConsumer and Corporate Affairs) House ofCommons
Debates. February 12, 1968, p-6623
14 -b·d
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IS. Joel Lexchin The Real Pushers, A Critical Analysis of the Canadian Drug Industry
(Vancouver:New Star Books, 1984) p-163
16 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
17. Lexchin, op.cit. p-163
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the Patent Act explains why:
In the case of any patent for an invention intended for or capable of
being used for the preparation or production of food or medicine , the
Commissioner shall, unless he sees good reason to the contrary, grant
to any person applying for the same, a license limited to the use of the
invention for the purpose of the preparation or production of food and
medicine but not otherwise; and, in settling the tenns of such license
and :fixing the amount ofroyalty or other consideration payable, the
Commissioner shall have regard to the desirability ofmaking the food
or medicine available to the public at the lowest possible price
consistent with giving to the inventor the due reward for the research
leading to the invention. 18
Between 1923-1969, only 49 applications were made and 22 licenses were
approved. Only one of the licenses granted was to residents of Canada. It has been
argued that there were a number of "supply side constraints," 19 related to the size
of the Canadian market which inhibited the manufacture ofpatented drugs in
Canada by generic companies. While the patentee imported a large percentage of
the active ingredients in bulk fonn and prepared the dosage fonn easily, generic
companies were not pennitted to import those ingredients as section 41 (3) of the
Patent Act demonstrates, and therefore generic companies had to establish their own
raw material plants to support their production. Another controversial issue arising
out of Section 41 (3) of the Patent Act was its failure to encourage competition.
And, according to the commissioner ofpatents, he was not sure if he had the
authority to issue compulsory licenses for the importation of a drug.
18. cited in Gorecki, op. cit. p.30-31
19 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
85
Other constraints included the fact that the period ofwaiting time for generic
companies to get a license approved took from five and a half months to two and a
half years. It was alleged that brand name companies wilfully delay the applications
for licenses for as long as they could, so as to discourage small manufacturers from
"successfully undertaking an application." 20 At the same time, costs of advertising
for small generic companies were prohibitive. This prevented meaningful
competition with the major companies who were already spending 30 percent of
their gross earnings on promotion and advertising. As a result smaller companies
were restricted to competing by supplying drugs only to hospitals and government
agencies. Finally provincial laws with the exception ofAlberta did not pennit
product selection by phannacists and doctors, while at the same time no data were
provided on the therapeutic equivalence of a product.
As a result the compulsory license provision of the 1923 Patent Act failed to
encourage generic competition. The Liberal government of 1969 was aware of those
disadvantages and was prepared to institute radical changes through an amendment
to the 1923 Patent Act in an attempt to encourage generic competition in an attempt
to reduce the prices of drugs. However, before the 1969 amendment, the
government agreed to remove its seven percent sales tax on phannaceuticals and to
reduce tariffs from 20% to 15% on drugs,21 in an effort to reduce the prices of drugs.
20 ·b·d
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21. House of Commons Debates. February 12, 1968. op.cit. p-6623
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But, after an evaluation was made, it was revealed that while these measures slightly
reduced the costs of drugs, "Canadian prices are substantially higher than the lowest
prices available elsewhere" 22 and in fact "most drug producers appear to have
passed on the bulk of the sales tax removed" 23 to the consumers_ The government
therefore decided to push ahead with its amendments_
As part of its package to reduce the prices of drugs, the Liberal government
amended Section 41 (3) of the 1923 Patent and Trade Marks Act as follows:
Where, in the case of any patent for an invention intended or capable of
being used for medicine or preparation or production ofmedicine, an
application is made by any person for a license to do one or more of
the following things as specified in the application, namely:
(A) where the invention is a process, to use the invention for the
preparation or production ofmedicine, import any medicine in the
preparation or production of which the invention has been used or sell
any medicine in the preparation or production ofwhich the invention
has been used, or
(B) where the invention is other than a process, to import, make, use or
sell the invention for medicine or for the preparation or production of
medicine, the commissioner shall grant to the applicant a license to do
the things specified in the application except such, if any, of those
things in respect of which he sees good reason not to grant such a
license; and, in settling the tenns of the license and fixing the amount
of royalty or other consideration payable, the commissioner shall have
regard to the desirability ofmaking the medicine available to the public
at the lowest possible price consistent with giving to the patentee due
reward for the research leading to the invention and for such other
factors as may be prescribed.24
22. ibid., p-6624
23 -bed
. 1 1 .,
24. quoted in Gorecki, Ope cit. p-36
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In other words, the Liberal government's amendment of 1969 to the Patent
Act also "provides beyond any doubt that the authority of the commissioner of
patents to issue compulsory licenses for patented drugs shall extend to the import of
drugs in all fonns." 2S It also allowed for the importation and sale ofpatented drugs
by other companies as well as the active ingredients to manufacture. Drugs sold in
foreign countries at cheaper prices could now be imported without violation of the
Trade Marks Act and sold at cheaper prices compared to those sold in Canada by
brand name companies. This means that the patent owner was no longer entitled to
an exclusive monopoly protection and could not refuse to grant a license to a
prospective individual or company to produce or import a cheaper brand of a
patented drug. The monopoly patent protection was also reduced to seven years
from a period of twenty.
Accompanying the amendments was the introduction of a series ofmeasures
to make generic drugs more competitive in the market. Under the new plan, doctors
were infonned, through the infonnation services of the Department ofNational
Health and Welfare, of alternative cheaper brands of drugs, their clinical
effectiveness, contra-indications and toxicity. The services provided by this agency,
it was hoped, would neutralize the dominance of the brand name industry who
through their "detail men" were able to control and influence doctors on what drugs
2S. Hon. John Turner. (Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs) House ofCommons
Debates. February 13, 1968. p-6624
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to prescribe to patients. The intention of the government was to reduce what it
claimed was the 30 per cent of the cost of every dollar spent by the drug industry on
promotion and advertising.
Reaction of Multinationals.
Intellectual patent protection rights are worth millions of dollars for
multinational drug companies. No doubt, the Liberal legislation has been one of the
most controversial issues raised in Canadian public policy that has been fought over
bitterly between the Conservative party, as defenders of the cause ofmultinationals,
as opposed to the Liberals, at that time, and the NDP, who preferred a solution
based on domestic needs. In one of the most complex and difficult episodes in the
history of Canadian lobbying, multinationals launched a vigorous campaign to
prevent the amendments. Threats and warnings were made to the public on the
future of the brand name industry in Canada. They complained that they would
eventually have to close their Canadian operations and the lives ofmillions of .
Canadians would be at a risk as a result.
Quebec's Defence of the Industry in the 1960's.
Some members of the Federal opposition.Conservative party from Quebec
opposed the 1969 legislation on the grounds that it would affect new investments in
the province. Quebec's Liberal M.P. Raymond Rock described the proposed
legislation as a threat to the 21 Montreal- based phannaceutical companies and
thousands of their employees, many ofwhom, according to him, were graduates of
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Universities in Montreal and McGill. Rock also introduced, for the first time in the
debate, a token of regionalism, in his defence of the industry. He questioned the
support for the legislation by the Liberal representative of St. John's West,
Newfoundland, Mr. Cashin, asking what would be his reaction if the Federal
government decided to import cheaper fish from Russia or Portugal? According to
Rock, he had no doubt that Cashin "would playa different tune on his fiddle ifhe
had a few phannaceutical companies in St. John's Newfoundland. "26 However,
despite the apprehension ofRock, investments in Quebec did not decrease, but
rather increased as a result of the legislation as will be demonstrated later.
Response of Multinationals
Despite the opposition from the multinational industry and to a lesser extent
from some Quebec MP's and the opposition Progressive Conservative party, the
government proceeded with its amendments. It came as a disappointment to the
industry and brought to a temporary end "one of the strongest and most boorish
lobbies "ever mounted on Parliament Hill," 27 According to John Gilbert, an NDP
Member ofParliament, during the debates on the amendment of the Patent Act of
1923, "The drug representatives were lined up in the galleries and there was a
constant running back and forth with speeches they had prepared for certain
26. Hon. Raymond Rock. (Iacques-Cartier-Lasalle) House of Commons Debates. Ope cit.
p-6698
27. John Sawatsky and Harvey Cashmore "Inside Dope." This Magazine
August/September 1986, p-6
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members of the opposition. "28 The Progressive Conservative party, which opposed
the amendments vehemently, eventually acknowledged defeat. According to
J.M.Forrestall (Halifax) a member of the Conservative party "as far as his party and
the PMAC were concerned it (the amendment) was inevitable and there was no use
in fighting further. ,,29
Members of the Phannaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada
(PMAC), although conceding defeat were anxious t,o thwart the effects of
compulsory licenses. As much as $250.000 was spent annually in a campaign to
prevent generjc companies from taking advantage of compulsory licenses.3o The bill
was immediately challenged through a legal action from American Home Products
(a member of the PMAC) which managed to delay the implementation of the bill by
a year. Of 69 licenses issued under new compulsory license laws there were, by the
end of 1971, 43 lawsuits filled against generic manufacturers.31 The purpose of these
lawsuits was mainly to delay the production of generic drugs while at the same time
to "to inflictlegal costs on their opponents. "32 According to an official "they were
28. Ronald Lang The Politics ofDrugs. The British and Canadian Pharmaceutical
Industries and Governments: a comparative Study (U.S.A, England: Saxon Housel Lexington
Books, 1974) p-247
29 ·b·d
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30. Lexchin. Pharmaceutical and Patents. p-2
31. Joel Lexchin "Pharmaceutical, Patents and Politics: Canada and Bill C-22."
International Journal ofHealth Services. Vo1.23, Number 1, 1993, p-148
32. Sawatsky and Cashmore. op. cit. p-7
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using the same arguments all the time,"33 up until the end' of 1986.
Effects on Prices
The introduction of the 1969 amendment to the Patent Act brought the prices
of drugs to Canadian consumers to a dramatic low. Acording to Sawatsky and
Cashore,
The same quantity of Valium that sells for $345.93 in the U.S goes for
$80 in Canada. The reason Hoffinann-LaRoche, the patent holder,
discounts the Canadian prices by more than seventy five percent is that
the generic equivalent, Diazepam, sells as low as $2.31. Pfizer charges
$431.58 for CWorpropamide in the U.S and only $141.80 in Canada
because it has to compete with a generic called Diabinese at $19.03. 34
Hoffinann-LaRoche could not bear the new competitive spirit of the market
and began "undercutting its generic competition. ,,35 Within a period of a year, it
distributed free of cost a total of eighty-two million pills of Valium at a value of$2.6
M.36 Under the Combines Investigation Act, charges were laid against the company
which was found guilty of selling a product at an "an unreasonably low price [for the
purpose] of lessening or eliminating competition. ,,37
33 ·b·d
· 1 1 .,
34 ibid., p-8
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36. Lexchin. The Real Pushers p-20
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Effects on Generic Companies
At the beginning, the opening up of Canada's phannaceutical market through
competition made it less expensive for generic companies to import patented drugs
rather than to manufacture here in Canada, since generic companies had to "prove
the bioequivalency, and in some case had to repeat the tests that brand name
companies had already conducted. "38 This was a time-consuming and costly venture;
as a result, generic manufactured drugs often took a number ofyears before they
reached consumers, which meant a delayed competition against monopoly patent
holders. Finally, upon the introduction of generic drugs, the cost was on an average
40 percent cheaper than brand name drugs.
Effects on the Multinational Drug Industry
Despite the introduction of compulsory licenses provincial health care and
drug benefit program assistance bills kept increasing. Although generic drugs
reduced the profit level ofmultinational drug companies by some $85 to $165 M, by
the end of 1980 the "average before tax profit on capital employed for the
phannaceutical industry was 22.8 percent or 73 percent higher than that for all
manufacturing industries."39 By 1983, according to the 1985 Report of the
Commission of Inquiry on the Phannaceutical Industry, savings to consumers based
on the calculations of32 out of 42 compulsory licenses in 1983 were in the vicinity
38 ·b·d
. 1 1·.,
39. Lexchin. The Real Pushers Ope cit. p-173
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of $211million annually,40 which accounted for only 3.1 percent of the brand name
phannaceutical market.41
Also, the industrial output of the multinational drug industry increased in
constant dollars between 1967 and 1982 by 133 percent compared with an increase
for all manufacturing of only 44.5 percent.42 It is presumed that this increase can be
attributed to the development of the publicly-financed drug programs and the
'greying' of the population. The assets of the industry grew from $256 Min 1967 to
$1.3 billion in 1982. This represents an increase of410 percent compared to 351
percent for all of the nation's manufacturing.43
Employment within the industry increased by 29 percent between the years
1967 and 1982 compared to less than four percent for the Canadian manufacturing
sector during the same period.44 Research and development during the same period
increased by 448 percent, even though it still remained the lowest for the developed
world. Profit levels continue to increase at an incredible rate and by the end of 1987
the rate ofreturn on equity of the industry surpassed all other industries in Canada
by a tremend~us margin.4S The levels ofprofits exceeded that ofmost developed
40. Roy Davidson "The scope ofPatents. " Policy Options December 1986, p-4
41. Lexchin. "Pharmaceutical, Patents and Politics." p-149
42 D ·d · 3
. aVl son. Ope Clt.p-
43 ·b·d
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44. Davidson. op.cit. p-3
4S. Lexchin, "Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Politics." Ope cit. p-149
countries with the exception of the U.S46 (see next page).
46. Harry Eastman Report of the Commission ofInquiry of the Pharmaceutical Industry
(Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1985) p-277
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Rate o/return on equity/or pharmaceutical industry, be/ore taxes, 1972 -1987
(Rate ofreturn, %)
Ranking of
Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical
Industry All Industry Industry
1972 24.7 14.1 8
1973 24.3 19.7 17
1974 27.4 22.8 19
1975 25.0 17.8 12
1976 22.7 15.8 15
1977 21.4 14.7 16
1978 22.7 17.4 20
1979 28.3 21.9 17
1980 30.1 20.1 10
1981 31.0 17.4 6
1982 30.0 5.4 7
- 1983 33.9 9.9 3
1984 40.3 15.7 2
1985 41.1 12.7 3
1986 45.5 14.9 1
1987 42.2 16.2 1
Source: Statistics Canada. Corp.oration Financial Statistics - Detailed Income
and Retained Earning Statisticslor 182 Industries.
The evidence provided above demonstrates that the multinational
phannaceutical industry successfully adjusted to the 1969 legislation and, despite its
threats to close its operations in Canada, they chose to remain here.
Despite the overwhelming fmancial success of the industry, the PMAC
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continued its lobbying efforts in an attempt to get government to change Section
41(4) of the Patent Act in exchange for voluntary price cuts and an increase in .
investments, manufacturing and research in Canada. However, according to Dr. Joel
Lexchin, an examination of the PMAC promise revealed that "most of the new
research and d,evelopment and manufacturing promised by the industry was either
already planned or was to be financed through government incentive programs. ,,47
The industry once again threatened to pullout of Canada. if extended intellectual
property rights were not given and warned of future plant closings and a reduction
ofresearch and development.
Impact of the Change on Quebec
The multinational industry's attempt to change the 1969 legislation received
key support from some of the Liberal and Conservative members of the Federal
parliament from Quebec and other provinces on various occasions. For example, the
leading spokespersons from Quebec were Hal Herbert ( Liberal-Vaudreuil, home
base ofHofImann-La Roche), David Berger (Liberal-Laurier) and Andre Ouellet
(Liberal-Papineau-Saint-Michel). Also there were Dr. Stanley Hudecki (Liberal-
Hamiliton West) Gordon Gilchrist (PC-Scarborough West) and Dr. Gary Gurbin
(pC-Bruce-Grey). Their efforts continued despite the fact that the industry in
Quebec had grown at an average rate of9% from1969 to 1974. In 1974, it was
47. Lexchin. The Real Pushers. p-176
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ranked as the province's 21st largest industry. Its contribution to the Quebec G.N.P
in 1975 was $350 million and Quebec accounted for 60% of drugs produced in
Canada. Total output produced by the industry in 1975 was $290 million while
investments in land and buildings were to the tune of$130 million.4-8 By the mid-
seventies the area of concentration for the multinational drug industry was in
Montreal and Toronto areas with a ratio of 60 to 40 in favor ofMontreal.
However, by the end of 1970's, there was a massive exodus ofmany
phannaceutical companies from Montreal to Toronto. But, before this change was
occurring, the PMAC in 1977 was already reminding the Quebec government of the
positive economic and social support the industry was providing to the province.
According to the industry, it was up to the Quebec government to continue "to
mamtain a climate enabling the industry to develop and to continue its contribution
to the economy. ,,49 It is not clear what message the industry was sending to the
Quebec government. However, the decision by many multinationals to relocate their
facilities to Toronto was probably a conscious effort, to get the Quebec government
involved in defence of the multinational industry, in its effort to change the 1969
legislation, since Quebec was now losing out on new investments by the industry.
48. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Asssociation of Canada. The Pharmaceutical Industry in
Quebec. (Ottawa: PMAC, 1977) p-3
49 ·b·d
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R.C Kenneth, gives some of the reasons for the relocation of the industry to
Toronto;
1. General gravitional shift ofmarket westward applying to all
commodities.
2.Toronto is the focal point of the medical-scientific community.
University, hospital and research facilities are readily available.
3.Toronto provides the advertising and marketing environment required
for production promotion.
4.Qualified technicians and production staff are available.
5.Toronto is centrally located to better serve the national market with
excellent transportation facilities.
6. Toronto provides a politically stable, provincially receptive trade
climate, with few language constraints. so
While R.C Kenneth provided some reasons for the relocation of drug
industries to Toronto, it was also suggested by some analysts that, as a result of
increased sales and expansion of the industry, it was no longer economically
feasible to continue operations at the Montreal facilities since it would require costly
renovation and modernization of the "old" Montreal plants. Therefore, the
alternative was to build new facilities, rather than renovating the old ones. As a
result, Toronto was chosen. The new investments, according to an industry official,
" resulted in a very modeTIl, highly productive industry, with the potential to
increase capacity and-remain competitive. ,,51
In 1982 and 1983 Hoffinan-LaRoche and Ayerst closed some of their
so. R.C. Kenneth The Pharmaceutical Industry in Canada. (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1982) p-13
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manufacturing and research facilities in Montreal, Quebec. Members of the PMAC
attributed the closure to a lack of confidence in Canada's intellectual property
protection laws. But according to John Sawatsky and Harvey Cashore, these
facilities were closed mainly for economic reasons as part "of a world-wide trend
toward centralized research in the United States, Switzerland and West Gennany.,,52
The chainnan ofAyerst, Donald Davies, explained "It's simply far more efficient to
do all our research in one place. "53 The loss of350 jobs from these industries, and
the high unemployment rate in Quebec, encouraged the lobbying efforts by the
PMAC, who concentrated most of their attention on the Quebec Liberal caucus in
Ottawa, since quite a large majority of the phannaceutical industry was based in
Montreal. The PMAC promised to invest more in Quebec in exchange for a change
in the intellectual patent laws.
Liberal Government Attempts to change 1969 Legislation
The Deputy head of the Liberal caucus, Andre Ouellet, was also the Minister
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. His responsibility for the protection of
Consumers Affairs and, as the chiefwhip, in defence of the political interests ofhis
Quebec caucus made him an 'ideal' source of influence for the PMAC. John
Sawatsky and Harvey Cashore in their article "Inside Dope," described the position
52. Sawatsky and Cashmore. Ope cit. p-7
53. quoted in Lexchin. The Real Pushers op.cit. p-177
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ofMr. Ouellet as "The proverbial fox," 54 charged with the responsibility of
"guarding the hen house. ,,55
During his tenn in office as Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
(1982-1983) Ouellet responding to pressure in the House of Commons wasted no
time in appointing a committee, to review the issue of compulsory licenses.56 The
head of the committee was Martin O'Connell, a consultant and lobbyist for Eli Lilly
and the PMAC and a fonner Liberal MP. O'Connell recommended an extension of
market exclusivity for patented drugs for a period of eight years.57 This was
followed by a proposal by Mr. Ouellet, to amend Canada's Patent Act "to create a
better climate for investment and research in Canada,"~8 and the recommendation of
a study of the following possibilities: "market exclusivity, a variable royalty rate and
allowing compulsory license on only some drugs,"59 as a guide for consideration.
The announcement by the Minister brought about protests from the National Anti-
Poverty Organization, the Consumers Association of Canada, the Medical Refonn
Group of OntariQ and many other social groups.
It is not clear whether the protests by various groups contributed to Mr.
S4. Sawatsky and Cashmore. Ope cit. p-9
ss ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
S6. House of Commons Debates. April, 1983
S7. House of Commons Debates. April 11, 1983. p-24341
sa. Lexchin. The Real Pushers. op.cit. p-179
S9. Sawatsky and Cashmore. op.cit. p-9
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Ouellet's demotion on August 1983 in a cabinet shufile to the Ministry ofLabor.
The new Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs was Judy Erola, the present
head of the PMAC. According to her, the lobbying was so intense by the Quebec
caucus, the PMAC and groups opposed to any increase in the prices ofbrand name
drugs that it was perhaps "the strongest I've ever seen." Erola was accused of
"retarding the development of drugs to cure cancer and heal all sort of illness," by
the multinational drug industry, and being personally responsible for "people's
death, ,,60 by not doing anything to help the industry to repeal the 1969 legislation.
The events that unfolded were too 'hot' for the government to handle
especially in an election year. The Liberal government did not want to isolate its
Quebec constituency. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid further conflict, Erola
appointed a one-person commission of inquiry, to be headed by the eminent
University of Toronto economist, Professor Harty Eastman.
Election of Conservative Government and Bill C-22
By the time the Eastman Report was fmished, a new government led by the
Progressive Conservative party took power with a strong Quebec majority. Before
winning the 1984 Federal Elections, Brian Mulroney had already pledged his
support to the multinational drug industry while on an election campaign visit to
Montreal.61 Mulroney was also fully infonned by President Reagan while on a visit
60. ibid., p-IO
61. Lexchin. ttPharmaceuticals, Patents and Politics. tt p-153
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to Washington, shortly before he won the election, on how the u.S felt about the
issue of 'intellectual property', and the 1969 legislation.62
The Eastman Report was presented to the new Progressive Conservative
government in 1985. It concluded that compulsory licenses were working well, and
had saved Canadians millions of dollars and should be kept. There was no evidence
that the profitability ofphannaceutical companies was in any way hampered
because of compulsory licenses. The report however recommended that generic
companies pay a much higher royalty rate to brand name companies than the present
four percent rate. With the new Conservative government in power, multinational
drug companies demanded an immediate freeze on the granting of compulsory
licenses on all drugs, and campaigned once again for new legislation to extend
monopoly patent protection. The strength of the PMAC lobby forced the new
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Michel Cote, to make an agreement
with representatives of the Liberal party and members of the Canadian Drug
Manufacturers Association (representatives of generic manufacturers) to agree to a
temporary moratorium that would prevent the issuing of further compulsory licenses
for a period of 120 days. In exchange, PMAC companies promised to stop suing
generic companies over old patents.63 But within a couple of days of the signing of
the moratorium, a member of the PMAC broke its side of the deal by instituting
62. ibid., p-154
63. ibid., p-154
p-134
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legal action once again against a member of CDMA over the issue ofPatents. The
violation of tenns of the moratorium led other generic companies to apply for more
compulsory licenses.
Perhaps the most significant change in favor ofmembers of the PMAC was a
commitment by the Conservative government in 1985 to a free-trade deal with the
U.S, which exposed it to stronger lobbying from the u.s government, the PMAC
and the Quebec caucus of the Conservative party for an amendment of the Patent
Act.64 At the fIrst official meeting ofBrian Mulroney as Prime Minister of Canada
with President Ronald Reagan in Quebec City on March 1985, the concerns of the
multinational drug industry were raised by the Americans.65 Following the meeting,
Vice-President George Bush announced that Canada had made a commitment to
change its Patent Act.66 By the end of June 1986 he "publicly complained about the
delay in the changes. "67
Quebec's support for stronger intellectual protection laws was strengthened,
however, when it was revealed that Quebec's share .of employment out of 134
establishments within the phannaceutical industry had been reduced from 47.1% in
1976 to 39.3% in 1985. Ontario gained from Quebec's loss, from 50.5% in 1976 to
64. Swatsky and Cashmore. Ope cit. p-9
6S. Linda McQuaig The Quick and the Dead (Toronto: Penguin Books of Canada, 1991)
66. Swatsky and Cashmore. Ope cit. p-l0
67. Lexchin. "Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Politics. "op.cit. p-151
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57.4% in 1985. Also, Quebec's share in shipments and added value dropped from
46.5% and 45% in 1976 to 40.8% and 41.85 in 1985, while Ontario's share grew
from 51.2% and 53.6% to 56.9% and 57.0% by 1985.68 It should be noted, however,
that the accuracy of these figures is questionable since they failed to take into
account the impact of increased generic production in Ontario and the introduction
of advanced technology by multinationals.
The Prime Minister, in response to pressure from the multinational industry
and the Quebec and American governments, declared that Canadians were "acting
as a scavenger in the area of intellectual property. ,,69 But, the Canadian government
was reluctant to acknowledge that its decision to extend intellectual patent property
protection was something it had agreed to as a condition for free trade. However, an
examination of the final text of the agreement confmned suspicions of a linkage
between compulsory licenses and a free trade deal. According to the proposed
agreement, the intent was " to make progress towards establishing of adequate and
effective protection ofphannaceuticals in Canada by liberalizing the compulsory
license provision. "70 Some members of the Progressive Conservative party were
68. The Quebec Economy 1987. (Minister of Supply and Services, Canada. June, 1988) p-
69. Swatsky and Cashmore. op.cit. p-12
70. Lexchin. "Pharmaceutical, Patents and Politics. "op.cit. p-151
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appalled and "demanded the removal of that section"7! from the fmal text of the
agreement. Nonetheless, in return for free trade with the U.S, the Mulroney
government passed legislation under Bill C-22 to extend monopoly patent protection
from seven to ten years.
Introduction of Bill C-22
The introduction ofBill C-22 in 1986 was more about pleasing the U.S.
government and the Quebec caucus of the Conservative party than it was to increase
research and development in Canada. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his
Quebec caucus developed a grand '·'vision of a high-tech phannaceutical industry
that would benefit Quebec particularly and that led them to push for a weakening of
the compulsory license provision"72 in Canada. The PMAC in turn has nurtured that
vision by making a number ofpromises to increase their members level of
investments in research and development in exchange for a change in the Patent Act.
The Mulroney-led Conservatives introduced Bill C-22 in April 1986 with a
promise "to review more extensive patent protection ,,73 within a few years. In the
fall of 1986 Harvie Andre, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, introduced
Bill C-22 that extended monopoly patent protection to a period of ten years.
71. Washington Post U.S bowed to Canadian demands to change pact. October 17,
1987. p-A13
72 D ·d · 5
. aVl son. Op.Clt. p-
73. Ruth Scher "Patent Greed." The Facts Vol. 13, No.3, December 1992. p-38
.1
1
p-2
106
According to the government, Bill C-22 would create
an unprecedented private sector investment in research and
development during the next ten years of $1.4 billion over and above
the present trend in the industry, thereby directly creating some 3000
scientific and research relatedjobs.74
Estimates also put forward by the federal government suggested that 1500 new
research and development jobs would be created by 1991 and by 1996 there would
be another 1500 jobs. According to the Conservatives, changes had to be made
under Bill C-22 in order to hannonize Canada's policy on intellectual property with
those of other developed countries, to enhance Canadian chances of becoming at
"the forefront of leading nations in phannaceutical research and development. "75
However, according to the infonnation provided below, to make Canada the
'forefront of leading nations' of research and development, the PMAC member
companies would need to triple their promised expenditures in research and
development before the end of 1996, since Canada ranked second to last of all
developed countries.
74. Canadian Drug Manfacturers Association. The Staraight Facts No.5, September. 1991,
7S ·b·d
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R&D Expenditures by the Pharmaceuticals Industry As a Percentage of
Industry Sales (Selected Countries, 1989)
Country R & D/Saies Ratio
Sweden 21.8
United Kingdom 20.9
West Gennany 17.9
United States 14.2
France 14.1
Japan 13.9
\ Denmark 10.7
Norway 10.6
Finland 9.8
Italy 9.6
,Belgium 9.0
Netherlands 8.8
·Canada 8.2
. Spain 2.6
(Source: SCRIP"Yearbook 1991", Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, Second
Annual Report 1990)
In spite of the weakness of the PMAC promises, the government argued that
measures undertaken under Bill C-22 were justified because of
a commitment on the part of the innovative phannaceutical industry to
advance Canada into the forefront of leading nations in phannaceutical
research and development by doubling the ratio ofR&D to sales under
5% today to 10% by 1995.76
The PMAC immediately welcomed the government's initiative as something which it
had been fighting for a long time and pledged
we will guarantee you that we will keep the price of drugs below the
cost of inflation... [and] we will increase our level ofR&D to eight
76 ·b·d 3
.1 1 ., p-
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percent in 1991 and ten percent by 1995."
Impact on Jobs
The proposal by government to increase monopoly patent protection for
brand name companies was received with tremendous opposition from various
groups including provincial governments, organizations involved with health care,
senior citizens and anti-poverty organizations. Fears were expressed by many that
this was only the first phase of a grand attempt to "Americanize" the Canadian
phannaceutical industry. The government, as a result, was forced to go on the .
defensive, to convince the public that 3,000 more professional scientific jobs would
be created, despite the fact that its own department of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs advised it in a report in spring 1985 that only 1,700 jobs would be created in
the professional category, while another 650 jobs would be created for laboratory
technicians and the remaining 650 jobs would be in the field ofmanagers, clerks,
cleaners etc.'8
Notwithstanding, the projections and promises for new scientific jobs,
multinational drug companies failed to keep their promise. According to the
Montreal Gazette, "only 1,386 jobs were created between 1987 and 1990, and
nearly half of these jobs were in marketing and sales with only a third in research
77. Hon. Ron MacDonald (Dartmouth) in House of Commons Debates. September 17,
1992. p-13266
7B. quoted in Lexchin, Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Politics. Ope cit. p~153
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and development. ,,79 But, while some jobs were created by the end of 1990, "public
evidence indicates that the multinationals are actually eliminating jobs in Canada."so
At the same time 700 jobs were lost due to plant closures in the process.Sl
Impact on Research and Development
It is debatable how much the multinational drug industry has complied with
its promises to increase investments in R&D. Allegedly these companies had been
preparing since 1985 for changes in the Patent Act. As a result they
managed to diminish the proportion of their sales invested in research
and development to the lowest level in the decade in order to
afterwards say that they had increased their investments in research
and development.S2
As was the case of Quebec, this deception by the industry proved to be a successful
ploy to win,further changes to the patent act in 1992, under Bill C-91. The Patent
Medicine Price Review Board in its fourth report in 1992 pointed out that the brand
name phannaceutical industry had reached 9_6 percent of its promised target for R
& D for 1991 out of total sales of $4 billion.83 The generic industry on the other
79. Montreal Gazette "High quality jobs for drug industry include cleaners." December 17,
1986 p-BI
80 -bed
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82. Hon. Howard McCurdy (NDP-Windsor-St. Clair,) House of Commons Debates.
November 17, 1992. p-13503
83. Patents Medicine Prices Review Board. Fourth annual report for the year ended
December 31, 1991. p-2
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hand, had invested over 10 percent of the industry's sales of $400 Min 1990.84 At
the same time, it would seem that the multinationals almost reached their target in R
& D, although most of it was paid by Canadian taxpayers. In Quebec, for example,
for every dollar the industry boasted ofputting into R and D, seventy cents of that
amount was contributed by the Quebec and Federal governments.85
Nevertheless, it is estimated that approximately 26.5 percent of total
expenditure on R&D was spent on basic research which involves the creation of
new drugs.86 The rest was spent on clinical research which involves the testing of
new drugs discovered in other countries on animals and volunteers, in order to pass
Canadian food and drug regulations. A large proportion of other research funds was
also spent on "product development," to fmd out which products and drugs, such as
pills, tablets, solutions and creams, consumers prefer most.
Impact on Prices
The effectiveness of the Patent Medicine Price Review Board which was
created under Bill C-22 to monitor the prices of drugs is seriously in doubt. Its
renewed authority to roll back excessive price increases under Bill C-91 "will by no
means serve as a substitute for price competition to lower the prices of drugs,"87
14. Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association. The Straight Facts No.6, December 1, 1991
IS. House ofCommon Debates. September 17,1992. p-13266
16 ·b·d
.1 1 .,
I'. Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association. Position Paper (CDMA, 1992) p-3
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which the government estimated would rise at about $129 M annually.ss It has been
alleged that the board is not fully equipped to control the cost ofnew drugs which
patentees are known to introduce at excessively high prices. Multinational
corporations are known to have ignored the PMPRB's price guidelines without any
action being taken against them, "a situation which accounts for non-compliance
rates at 30-40 per cent since 1987."89
Often described as a "toothless tiger," the Board failed to roll back increases
in the prices of drugs, despite the commitment given by the industry in 1987 to·
maintain its prices below the level of inflation and, to enforce government's
regulations.90 The inability of the board to perfonn its duties was confinned by its
own chainnan, in its fourth report to Parliament. According to him,
The high number ofprices out of compliance (that is breaking the
rules) suggests either that some patentees follow a strategy of setting
high introductory prices so as to benefit from the temporary gain, or to
resist the Board's guidelines.91
As many as 40 percent ofnew drugs introduced in the market were sold at prices
beyond the guidelines of the PMRB.92 The prices of drugs, after Bill C-22,
88. Globe and Mail "Drug firms promise to invest $400-million." June 24, 1992. p-Al
89. Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association. Position Paper op.cit.
90. House of Commons Debates. November 17, 1992. p-13506
91. Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. Ope cit. p-5
92. Hon. Ron MacDonnald.(Liberal- Dartmouth) House of Commons Debates. September
17, 1992. p-13272
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exceeded the increase "in the CPI by less than 2 percentage points, 6.2 percent
points as compared to 4.4 percent for the CPl. ,,93 The Board, despite acknowledging
that it was not capable of effectively monitoring the prices of drugs, has claimed that
there has been only a moderate increase of 3.2 percent.94
Evidence from the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan reveals that consumers paid
13.2 percent more for drugs and not 3.4 percent as claimed by the PMRB, during
the period of implementation ofBill C-22 to 1991.95 The Manitoba Health Insurance
Plan recorded an annual increase in prices of 12.3 percent.96 Green Shield, one of
the nation's largest operators of drug benefit plans, in a study conducted on the
prices of drugs, "confinned the worst suspicions linking extended patent protection
to higher prices. ,,97 It concluded that between the years 1987-1991 the average cost
of a prescription claim rose 11.4 percent annually which is two and a half times the
rate of inflation.98 According to the study, the average cost per drug (per claim for
insurance) "rose 53.8 percent over a four year period while the Consumer Price
93 ·b·d
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94. Patented Medicine Prices Review Board.op.cit.p-5
9S. cited in House ofCommons Debates. September 17, 1992, p-13267
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97. Scher. Ope cit. p-39
98. Green Shield Prepaid Services Inc. A Report on Drug Costs (Willowdale, Ontario:
Green Shield, April 1992)
113
Index rose by only 20.9 percent."99 The prices ofnew drugs have had a tremendous
impact on average drug costs because most new drugs are much more costly. "The
average cost per claim for new drugs in 1991 was $34.12, more than twice the
$16.04 average claim cost for existing drugs."loo
The above increases in the prices of drugs came as no surprise. According to
Joel Lexchin, even the government at the time of the introduction ofBill C-22 had
confinned a report, by its own Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, that
it expected a $100 M increase in the prices of brand name drugs between 1987 and
1991, and as a result offered the equivalent sum to provincial governments, to help
cushion the blow on provincial budgets. lol The above evidence·proved that there
was a much more substantial increase in prices.
Despite the industry's failure to keep its promises under Bill C-22, the
government reiterated that Bill C-91 was necessary in order to harmonize Canada's
monopoly patent protection laws with the United States and the European
community. Canadians would therefore stand to lose on new investments by the
multinational drug companies "that had kept their 1987 commitment in tenns of
research and development and would leave Canada,"lo2 if the industry did not get
99· ·b·d
. 1 I .,
100. Scher. op. cit. p-39
101. Lexchin. "Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Politics." p-154
102. Ministry of Consumer Affairs. op. cit. (Press Release.) p-2
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the protection it needs. According to the government, the urgency to act quickly was
inevitable if Canada was to remain competitive.
Role of the Bureaucracy
An analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the policy making process would
not be complete without reminding ourselves of the past political role of the
Progressive Conservative party in pushing for greater intellectual property
protection since the introduction of compulsory licenses in 1969 to the assumption
ofpower in 1984. Also significant are the key support given from its Quebec wing
and to some extent the silence of the Liberal party during the debates on Bill C-91.
Consideration must also be given to the international power and influence of the
industry and the role of the American government in GATT negotiations and
Canada's willingness to participate in FTA and NAFTA which confinns that
regardless of the position of the bureaucracy extended intellectual property
protection rights would be inevitable.
Given the fact that there was a clear political statement by the Mulroney
government in support ofmultinational drug corporations on intellectual property .i
rights, the expectation is that the bureaucracy will act accordingly to boost the
government's position. From a constitutional point of view it is the minister who is
responsible for the formulation ofpolicy based on his or her position as the elected
representative. The role of the civil servant, it is argued, is to appropriately follow
the orders ofhis or her superior. The debate as to the theory and practice of the
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distribution ofpower and influence of the bureaucracy and the elected representative
has been dealt with sufficiently elsewhere. However, at issue for our analysis is to
appreciate and understand the role and function of the bureaucracy on Bill C-91.
In order to assess the bureaucracy, it is necessary to analyze its role vis-a-vis
the actions of elected representatives and the representatives of the local generic
industries on Bill C-91. In their announcement that Canada would eliminate
compulsory licensing on January 14, 1992, Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry,
Science and Technology Canada, and Pierre Blais Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs confinned that
We have had ongoing and intensive discussions with both the generic
companies and the brand name companies in the last month and, in
particular, since the tabling of the GATT proposals on December 20,
1991.103
The above statement claims that there had been consultation between
December 20, 1991 and January 15, 1992 with the generic sector before the
decision was made. Bernard Shennan, president ofApotex Inc, in response to the
minister's statement claimed that there were no consultations with the generic sector.
According to him, on-January 10, 1992 the Assistant Deputy Minister of ISTc,
I.C.MacKay, faxed him and Leslie Dan, President ofNovaphann, a letter which
stated that
103. Bernard Sherman. "In the matter ofBill C-91 before the Parliament of Canada."
Mime0 , 1992. Note, all the data and information used on this topic are taken from the same
author.
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As you are aware, GATT negotiations are proceeding and member
countries are considering the Dunkel proposal which includes a section
on intellectual property protection measures.
Within this context, I would like to invite you to meet with us to find
out how you think the Dunkel proposal will impact on your company.
It is important to remember that shortly after the Dunkel proposal was made Canada
was the only country to immediately approve it. The Director General for the
Chemicals and Bio-Industries Branch of the ISTC, Dr. Elizabeth Dickson, requested
from Mr. Shennan and Mr. Dan their urgent input of the impact on the generic
sector before January 13, 1994. Dr. Dickson was told that it was impossible to do
so in a few days and they would need at least a week to do so. Despite that, the
government's announcement was made on January 14,1992.
According to Mr. Shennan,
In view of the fact that the announcement was made on January 14,
1992, I believe that Dr. Dickson must have known on January 10,
1992, contrary to the content ofMr. Mackay's letter, that the decision
would be announced on January 14, 1992. I thus believe that the only
possible explaination for her insistence that our analysis be submitted
by January 13, 1992 was to put ISTC in a position where it could claim
that we had been consulted before the announcement was made.
... , it became clear that the government had been involved in extensive
discussions with the foreign-owned multi-national brand name
companies, just as was acknowledged in the release on January 15,
1992, notwithstanding that the government failed to seek or obtain
meanful input from the Canadian-owned generic sector as to the
adverse impact on these sectors and on the health care system.
The evidence provided so far demonstrates some confusion and deliberate
misrepresentation of the facts between members of the bureaucracy and elected
representatives. To compound matters further, the presentation of the estimated cost
impact of increased intellectual property protection by the ISTC by members of the
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bureaucracy was blatantly biased. According to a release by officials of the ISTC
and the Ministry of Conswner and Corporate Affairs
The cwnulative increased cost of drug purchases by physicians and
hospitals over the period 1992 to 1996 due the elimination of
compulsory licensing is estimated at $129 million (constant dollars),
less than $1 per Canadian per year, or less than 1/20 of one percent of
the total health care bill in Canada.
The increases in costs ofpurchases by pharmacies and hospitals of all
prescription and behind-the-counter drugs, due to the removal of
compulsory licenses, is predicted to be 0 percent in the first year,
gradually increasing to less than 2 percent annually by the year 2000.
The sources of input to the above analysis on the proposed increases in the prices of
drugs according to I.C. Mackay, ADM of the ISTC came from the following
sources,
(a) representations from the foreign-owned multi-national brand name
companies as to investment;
(b) The "trade community" in GATT and NAFTA negotiations; and
(c) "out of the civil service."
Again, as can be noted, no input from the generic sector was included. The
government's report (quoted above) on the purported increases in the prices of drugs
have been proven to be not accurate. According to the Patent Medicines Prices
Review Board, within two months of the passing ofBill-91, Canadians were paying
one of the highest prices for drugs once again in the world as will be demonstrated
later.
The nature and scope of the role of the bureaucracy on Bill C-91
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demonstrates the true representativeness and responsiveness of its functions to the
public. An understanding of its role must be linked to a wider theory of society that
explains our perception and understanding of the role of the state within a liberal
market oriented system, the dominant characteristic ofwhich is its subordination to
the interests of capital. The state's role is linked to the importance ofproduction to
satisfy the material needs of society. However, it is the way in which production is
organized and the social relations that are developed that provide the basis of
understanding the role of the state and the bureaucracy.104 Throughout the history of
Canada, the state has provided the means necessary, through grants, subsides and
investments on infrastructure works, to enhance the accumulation of capital. It is
the dominant class that benefits from state intervention and protection through its
coercive apparatus and accumulative role which places its influence above others in
the detennination of the policy process
Bill C-91, Social and Economic Consequences.
According to the Minister for Trade and Industry Michael Wilson, it was
inevitable to amend the monopoly patent act under Bill C-91 (see page 87). Yet, he
also complained of the "tremendous pressure"10S. imposed on the government from
the international community, however, no mention was made of the consequences
of a proposed negotiation for a free trade deal with Mexico and the United States in
104. David Beetham Bureaucracy (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota, 1987) p-72
lOS. Toronto Star Ope cit. June 25, 1992, p-A11
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the winter of 1990-1991. Mexico's decision to give full patent protection for brand
name multinational drug manufacturers, as a prelude to the beginning of free trade
negotiations, forced the multinational phannaceutical industry to openly renege on
their promises under Bill C-22. The industry publicly declared that it "could
unilaterally abandon the commitments it made to Canada in 1987 about increasing
research and development spending here. "106 It also made it quite known that it was
"in no way bound by previous commitments it had made in Canada. "107 The
implication was that the industry must get the protection it wants. However, instead
ofreminding the multinational drug industry to keep its commitments under Bill C-
22, the Minister of Industry, agreed with its position by declaring, "What was good
in 1987 is no longer sufficient in 1992."108
As a condition for begining the North American Free Trade negotiations with
Mexico and the U.S, the Mulroney government agreed to abandon its compulsory
license provision for brand name drugs, while, at the same time, to support the
multinational industry's efforts to include global intellectual property rights
protection under GATT. According to the Toronto Star, the position of the
government was that ."even in the health care sector, the profit motive needs room to
106 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
107 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
108. Toronto Star "Major side effect ofTory prescription is higher drug prices." December
1, 1992. p-A19
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flourish. "109 and therefore, in keeping with their mandate, "to govern," any delay
would jeopardize the proposed $500 M in promised new investments by
multinational drug finns "in moving toward international competitiveness which is
crucial ifwe are going to achieve prosperity here in Canada."IIO Bill C-91 was
finally proclaimed into law on February 4th 1993. Ironically, the same day, the u.s
Congress released a report calling for a reduction ofmonopoly patent protection for
multinational drug companies in order to reduce prices.
The relevant parties who stand to be significantly affected by this legislation
include; individual Canadians who need prescription medications, government and
private insurance companies and government benefit programs which pay for the
prescriptions medicines for senior citizens and welfare recipients, foreign owned
multinationals represented by the PMAC and the locally owned generic
manufacturers represented by the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association.
The impact ofBill C-91 on the years of extended monopoly protection and its
added costs to Canadian consumers can be seen in table 1. Its aggregate impact in
constant and nominal dollars is outlined in table 2. (Both tables are taken from the
Prime Institute study)-
109 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
110 ·b·d
. 1 1 .,
~
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Table 1. Impact of Bill C·91 on Years of Extended Market Exclusivity and Added Cost to Canadians
Product Years on Generic Addod Added Cost Added Cost--
Intra. Market to - Launch Patent Year. of 1993·2000 1993·2000
Generic Name Brand Name Manufacturer Date Dec-92 wI C-22 Expiry Monopoly Nominal $ 93 const'
enalapril Vasotec Merck (Frosst) Aug-87 5.3 Aug-1994 Oct-~'OO7 '3.2 $444,055 $401,799
lovastatin Mevacor Merck (MSD) Jul-88 4.4 Jul-1995 Fel)-2001 [).6 $200,973 $181,799
omeprazole Losec Adria Jun-89 3.5 Jun-1996 Dec-2008 12.5 S149,3110 $133,924
simvostatin Zoeor Merck (Frosst) Aug-90 2.3 Aug-1997 Oct-2004 7,2 S118,737 $105,248
cisopride Prepulsid Janssen Jan-90 2.9 Aug-1995 Mor-2002 6.6 $101,155 $91,267
lisinopril Prlnlvil Merck (Frosst) Nov-90 2.1 Nov-1997 Oct-2007 9.9 $97,614 $86,525
lisinopril Zestril lei Nov-9Q 2.1 Nov-1997 Oct-2007 9.9 $Q7,614 $86,525
ciprotloxaeln Clpro Miles Jan-89 3.9 Jon-1996 Jul-2007 lIS $B5,062 $76,272
ondonsetron Zofran Glaxo May-91 1.6 May-1998 Mar-2008 Q.8 $83,292 $73,183
ketorolac Toradol Syntex Apr-91 1.7 Apr-1998 May-2001 3.1 $69,180 $60,850
cetlrizine Reactlne Pfizer Jun-91 1.5 May-1998 Jan-2003 4.7 $67,983 $59.732
sumotripton Imltrex Glaxo Feb-92 0.8 . Jan-l999 Aug-2005 6.6 $56,766 $49,442
pravostatin Provachol Squibb Oct-90 2.2 Oct-1997 Jul-2000 2.8 $45,443 $40.512
ceftriaxone Roeephln Roche Jul-87 5.4 Jul-1994 Sep-2006 12.2 $32.949 $30,127
omlodipine besyt Norvasc Pfizer Jan-93 -0.1 Jul-l99Q Jul-2010 11.0 530,532 $26,593
iohexol Omnlpaque Sanotl Oct-85 7.2 Oct-1992 Oct-l999 7.0 $25,622 $23,973
alfenfanil Alfenta Janssen Feb-1995 Jul-1998 3.4 517.877 $16,545
lorofidine Clorltln Scherlng Jun-88 4.5 Jun-1995 Jan-2001 5.6 $17,221 $15,646
ketoconozole Nlzoral Janssen Jan-85 7.9 Jan-1992 Nov-1996 4.8 $16,032 $15,381
ceftazidime Fortaz Glaxo Sep-85 7.3 Sep-1992 Mor-2000 7.5 $13,577 $12,620
vercuronlum Norcuron Organon Jul-86 6.4 Jul-1993 Dec-l999 6.4 $13,283 $12.372
ftunisohde Rhlnalar Syntex Feb-78 14.8 Feb-1993 Sep-2000 7.6 $13,139 $12,155
clorlthromyc\n Bloxtn Jul-92 0.4 May-l999 Aug-2004 5.3 $.13.785 $12,029
sufentonil Sufenta Janssen Jul-92 0.4 Oct-1992 Jun-1997 4.7 $11,615 $11.038
ticlopidine Tlelid Syntex sep-91 1.3 Sep-1998 Oct-2001 3.1 $11.697 $10.279
ofloxacin Floxfn Ortho Sep-91 1.3 Jun-1998 Jun-2001 3.0 $11,467 $10,138
cefuroxime Ceftln Glaxo Aug-90 2.3 Dec-1997 Feb-2007 9.2 $10,875 $9.559
ceflxime Suprox Lederle Jan-90 2.9 Jan-1997 Apr-2005 8.3 $9,614 $8,529
betoxolol Betoptlc Alcon Jul-86 6.4 Jun-1993 Mar-1997 3.8 $6.223 $5,950
fluconazole Dlflucan Pfizer Sep-90 2.3 Sep-1997 Feb-2002 4.4 $5,175 $4,592
imlpnem-cilostotin Primaxin Merck (MSD) Feb-92 0.8 Feb-l999 Nov-2001 2.8 $4,983 $4,341
flutomide Euflex Scherlng Jan-85 7.9 Jan-1992 Jun-1994 2.4 $4,320 $4,287
idarubicin Idomycin Adria May-91 1.6 Apr-1998 Nov-2008 10.6 $3.981 $3,499
mesna Uromltexan Bristol Feb-89 3.8 Feb-1996 Feb-l999 3.0 53,114 52,839
enalopril/HCTZ Vasoretlc Merck (Frosst) Oct-90 2.2 Oct-1997 Oct-2007 10.0 $1,985 $1, 760
nimodipine Nlmotop Miles Oct-89 3.2 Oct-1996 Dec-2007 11.2 $1,371 S1,230
fluoxetine Prozac Lilly Jan-89 3.9 Jan-1996 Mar-1996 0.2 $1,050 $987
Total Added Cost (1993-2000) $1.898.700 $1.703,547
Simple Average per Drug Entity 3.6 6.8 $51.316 $46,042
Wt. Average per Drug fntlty (92$ Sales) 4.1 8.0 $151,609 $136.768
M
M
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Table 2. Cost Impact of Bill C·91 In Nominal and Constant Dollars
Cost of Bill C-9)ln Nominal $ Cost of Bill C-9)ln )993 Constant $
(New DNgS before 1993) (New Drugs before • oner 1993) (New DNgl before 1993) (New Drugs befor. II ott., 1993)
Year Annual $ Cumulative $ Annual$ . Cumulatlye $ Annual $ Cumulgtlve $ Annual $ Cumulative $
1993 $6,523,(XX) $6.523,<XXJ S6.523.(xx) $6,523,(0) S6,523,cro $6,523.CXXl S6.523.COO S6.523.0c0
1994 S24,552,(xx) S31,075,(XX) S24.S52'cnl $31.075.(0) $24.CXXl.<XXl S30,523,(xx) S24.00J,cxx) S30.523.COO
1995 $61,524,(0) $92,599,(00 $61,524.CXXl S92,599,CXXl $58,962,(0) S89,485,(XX) S58.962.CXXl S89.485.CXXl
1996 S161,355,CXXl $253,954,CXXl $161,355,(xx) $253,954,(XX) $151,603,OCO $241,088,(0) $151,603.cro 5241,088.CXX>
1997 $253,644,CXXl $507,598,CXXl $253,644.(00 $507,598,(0) $233.640.OOJ 5474,728,CXX) S233.640,cxx) S474,728,CXXl
1998 $371.866,(xx) $879,464.(0) S371,866,(OO 5879,464. (XX) 5335.822,CXXl 5810,550.CXXl S335.822,(oo S810.550.(OO
1999 $477,655.(0) $1.357,119,(0) $477,655,(xx) $l,357,119,roJ $422,900,(XX) 51,233,450.CXXl 5422,c;oo,(XX) Sl,233.450,(xx)
2000 $541,58~(0) S1,898,701,(XX) $541 ,58~cxx) S1,898,70 l,roJ $470,097,CXXl 51,703,547,(XX) $470,097,(XX) $1,703.547,(00
2001 $474,145,(0) $2,372,846,(0) S561,950,(xx) $2,460,651,(0) S403,492,(O) $2, 107,039,(XX) $478,213,(00 52. 181.760,(XX)
2002 $411,448,(XX) $2.784,294,(0) 5598,470,OCX) 53,059, 121,(XX) $343,272,cxx) 52,450,311,COO $499.305,CXXl $2,681,065,CXXl
2003 $360,562,(0) $3. 144,856,(0) S630,983,CXX) $3,690,1Q.4,<XX> 5294,919,cro 52,745,230.CXXJ $516,108.0c0 S3, 197, 173,cro
2004 $328,987,(0) $3,473,843,(0) S694.529,(XX) $4,384,633,CXXl S263.816,CXXl $3,009,046.(00 5556,946.CXXl S3,754.119,cm
2005 5263, 124,(XX) $3,736.967,OCXJ 5674,255,(XX) $5,058,888,(XX) 5206,863,CXXl $3,215,909.CXXl S~'\O.086.(XX) $4.284.205.CXX>
2006 $212,233,(xx) S3,949.2CX),CXXl S742,815,CXXl 55,801,703,(XX) 5163,582,0C() $3,379,491,(XX) S572,537,(XX) 54.856, 742CXXl
2007 $175,570,(0) $4, 124,770,CXXl S687,648,CXX) $6,489,351,(XX) S132,670,(xx) 53,512, 161,(XX) S519,623,COO $5,376,365.CXXl
2008 $73,556,em $4,198,326,(0) $441,334,(0) $6,930,685,(00 $54,493,cxx) $3,566,654,(00 S326.956,(xx) S5,703.321..CXXl
2009 S30,814,(XX) S4.229,140,(XX) $1.109,293,(0) 58.039,978,CXXl $22,380,(XX) 53,589.034,cro S805.6ro.(XX) S6,509.0ltCOO
2010 $18,048,CXXl $4,247, 188,CXXl $1,096,527,(XX) $9,136,505,(0) $12,851,(XX) $3,601,885,(XX) $796,16\,(0) S7,305.172.COO
1993-2000 Sl,898,701.OCXJ $1,898,701,(XX) $1,703,547,(XX) $1,703,547.(0)
2001·2010 $2.348.487,(XX) $7,237,804,(XX) $1,898,338,(0) S5.6O\ .625.(0)
1993-2010 $4,247,188,00J $9. 136,505,(0) S3,601,885.00J $7,305, 172CXXl
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These estimates are provided by the renowned Prime Institute of the U.S. III
According to it, in 1993 Canadians would pay at about $6.5 M in extra costs. (Also
it is important to look at the analysis of the New York Times and the estimates
provided Frances Lankin, Ontario's Minister ofHealth on page 14.) However, the
costs ofBill C-91 will grow over the next few years. By the year 2000, the added
costs ofBill C-91 compared to the continuation ofBill C-22 will be $470 M
annually. The projected cumulative cost from 1993 to 2000 will be $1.7 billion, and
by the year 2010, it will increase to $3.6 billion. According to a report, this added
cost is without consideration for new compulsory license generic drugs that would
begin in 2001 for patented products introduced to the Canadian market in 1993 and
beyond. If one considers the effects of these new products in the first decade of the
next century the "cumulative costs from absence of lower-cost C.L generics by the
year 2010 would jump to $7.3 billion."112
Bill C-91, according to the calculations of the Prime Institute, will "result in a
three to one payback in eight years and a seven to one pay back (and up to a 15-to-
one) over 18 years,"113 to brand name companies in return for $500 M in promised
investments in research and development. Canadians would be better off if the
111. Stephen Schondelmeyer (prime Institute.) The cost ofBill C-91. An Economic Impact
Analysis ofthe Elimination of Compulsory Licensing ofPharmaceuticals in Canada. (Minneapolis:
College ofPharmacy, University ofMinnesota) January 21, 1993.
112. ibid.,p-6
113. Prime Institute. op.cit. p-7
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government had retained the previous provisions under Bill C-22 and subsidize'd the
proposed $500 M in research and development rather than extending the monopoly
patent protection ofbrand name companies.
The consequences of the Conservative government policy took less than two
months from the date of the passing of the drug patent legislation act into law to
materialize. A report by the Patent Medicine Prices Review Board (pMPRB), based
in an examination of 177 of the highest demanded drug products being sold,
confinned that 77 - or 43 percent of those products are sold at the highest or second
highest prices compared to other nations of the world. 114 Only Gennany and the
United States are reported to have an average higher price of brand name drugs. lIS
According to the Globe and Mail, during the heat of the debate on the merits ofBill
C-91, prices of prescription drugs increased 2.6 percent for the frrst six months of
1992 compared to a rate of inflation of 1.5 percent. 116
The effectiveness of the PMPRB can be seriously questioned, given the fact
that it was supposedly given additional powers to police excessive price increases
by the brand naIDe drug industry. The present guidelines of the board restrict
"introductory prices ofnew, breakthrough drugs to the international median price for
114. Toronto Star "Drug prices in Canada among top in world." Aprill, 1993. p-A15
lIS ·bed
. 1 1 .,
116. Globe and Mail "Study cites high cost of drugs in Canada." March 31,1993. p-Al and
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the same drugs,"ll7 The board has indicated that it wants "to expand its mandate in
order to hold the maximum introductory price of all new drugs to the international
median."118 According to the Board's chainnan, Harry Eastman, "I would make the
observation that our prices are a good deal higher, and this question ought to be
addressed by appropriately adjusting our guidelines. ,,119 However, a spokesman for
the PMAC has sharply rejected any proposed changes to the Board's guidelines by
saying "We recognize there should be fair pricing policies, but we don't agree with
this knee-jerk approach that what's good for Europe is good for Canada."120 The
PMAC in other words is saying that it doesn't matter if it is selling the same drugs
cheaper in Europe than in Canada.
This "knee jerk" approach has so far cost the multinational industry over $5
M in fines for exceeding price guidelinese Nonetheless, in response to the 'policing'
by the Patent Medicine Review Board, some brand name companies have given up
their patent protection on certain drugs rather than submitting themselves to the
PMRB guidelinese This pennits the companies involved to sell their drugs at
whatever prices they desire since, under the new regulation ofBill C-91, it would
117. Globe and Mail op.cit. March 31, 1993. p-A2
118 eb·d
. I 1 .,
119 eb·d
. I 1 .,
120. Toronto Star op.cit. April, 1993. p-A15
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take generic companies at least five years to get federal safety approval. 121
Conclusion.
The changes to Canada's intellectual property rights protection laws were
linked to a number of factors; namely the increase in investments and profits by the
multinational drug industry since the passing of the 1969 legislation, the advent of
the Conservative govennnent, free trade, NAFTA, and to some extent the role of
Quebec. Nonetheless, it should be noted that although Quebec played quite a
significant part in the changing of the 1969 legislation, it did not have much say in
the decision-making process for Bill C-91.This position will be explained in the
conclusion.
121. Toronto Star "Drug fmns must pay up for overcharging." January 4, 1994. p-
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Chapter 4
Internationalization of Intellectual Property Rights, the role of the
U.S. and Canada.
General Introduction.
A general understanding of the role of the state in seeking extensive
international intellectual property protection rights as a global policy instrument on
behalf ofmultinational phannaceutical companies is pivotal in understanding the
power and influence of the industry and of state-business relations. Its impact on the
policy process in Canada and in developing and less developed countries are more
significant, especially since for the frrst time in history, nation states are obliged to
obey intellectual property rights on a global scale without consideration of their
level of economic and technological development and the social consequences. In
liberal industrialized countries, the early phase of capitalism as a system was
dominated by the efforts of individual capitalists who fought to expand their
personal wealth by augmenting their share of the market. For Marx, the
development of the market mechanism was fundamental for the coming into
existence of the capitalist system. The market, he predicted, would be undennined
by the growth ofmonopolies through the control of technology, resources and
labour.
The world capitalist economy has gone through many important structural
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changes over the past centwy; the greatest of which has been the impact of the
contemporary scientific and technological revolution, l which has boosted the level
ofproduction and efficiency within the free market economy. As a consequence of
the fierce competitive nature of the free market economy those multinational
corporations who dominate and control the sciences, according to Mandel, becomes
progressively "the prisoners of capital. "2 This tendency results in the preponderance
of large monopolies to control the productive process, such as the phannaceutical,
auto, oil, electronic and computer industries.
Consequently, a contradiction between the motives and the growth of
scientific development and the social needs of the population is quite evident. More
especially, increasing social demand and need for adequate access to scientific
innovation and research is prevented by the inherent inclination to hold the sciences
captive ofprofit making enterprises. This accounts for the rise ofphannaceutical
and other TNC's, which not only dominate the marketplace but also the state policy
process in their best interests. Marx, in the Communist Manifesto, quite amply
bemoaned the fact that capitalism which claims to defend private property of the
means ofproduction, in reality expropriates the private property of a large number
1. Ernest Mandel Late Capitalism (London: Verso Publications, 1980.) p-249.
2. ibid., p-262
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ofpeople transfonning it into a few monopolies.3
The speedy merging and concentration ofmany phannaceutical industries,
from hundreds three decades ago to just about twenty dominant corporations at
present, is a good case in point. Capitalism was born out of free competition.
Nevertheless, according to Ernest Mandel, "free competition produces
concentration, and concentration produces the opposite of free competition, namely,
monopoly. ,,4 Through monopoly control, the market is mutually divided, production
is then limited to maintain high prices and thus exercise influence on the policy
process. Therefore, the rules of a free market economy are not and cannot be
applied.
As Marx would argue, because of a persistent and developing crisis in
capitalist relations ofproduction largely due to the contradiction between capital and
labour, we witness over the past years the advent of a number of recessions,
stagflation, the debt crisis, fall in profits, international competition and chronic
alienation of the work force. New and interesting phenomena have developed in the
1990's, that is, the advent of globalization and the introduction of the global
recognition of Intellectual Property Rights as a major inteTIlational public policy tool
for multinational corporations. This can be described as an attempt to extend the
3. Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin Books,
1986) p-86
4. Mandel, op.cit. p-249
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market mechanism to the control and privatization of ideas, knowledge, "from life
fonns to the application ofmathematical equations,"s to agricultural products, seeds
and even medical procedures in the hands of a few dominant corporations. In other
words, not only the means ofmaterial production but also the means of intellectual
production are being converted into global private property. Therefore, economic
exploitation is not only totalized, even worse it is globalized.
Of significant concern is the linking of intellectual property rights to the
application ofpatents of altered animals, plants, genetic materials, and inventions.
Through the usage ofDNA technology, multinational corporations are about to use
and manipulate life fonns in the creation of industrial products for commercial
profits.6 For example Dr. Freda Rajotte explains,
Toxic genes can be inserted into plants to make them distasteful to
pests. Transpecies organism such as "geep" (a mixture of goat and
sheep) can be produced. Animal characteristics can be inserted into
plants. [For example, the phosphorescence from glow wonn has been
inserted into tobacco plants to make them glow in the dark.] Human
genes can be inserted into sheep so that they produce phannaceuticals
in their milk.7
The tampering with human life fonn, the monopoly ofknowledge, ideas etc., for the
purpose ofmaking profits raises serious questions as to what extent are
5. Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell Take back the Nation (Toronto: Key Porter
Books, 1993) p-l05
6. Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice. Intellectual Property Rights in NAFTA
(Toronto: Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice, 1993).p-23
7 • Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice, op.cit. p-23
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multinationals willing to go to control and manipulate the sciences for their own
benefits. More significantly, there is a pronounced shift from an industrial based
economy to an infonnation-based one. As a result, capitalists are looking at new
ways of accumulating capital by tapping into a new source of wealth by privatizing
knowledge as intellectual private property. This potential of controlling a new
"well" ofwealth has encouraged multinational corporations to campaign for a new
regime of global intellectual property rights. According to the U.S. International
Trade Commission, multinational corporations will gain $100 billion annually from
greater intellectual property rights protection.8
Globalization and Intellectual Property Rights.
The concept "Intellectual Property Rights" became more prominent in the
American policy agenda shortly after the collapse of the Eastern and Soviet
"Socialist" State.s. For some, America had lost its 'imperial throne' as protector of
'free nations' and the task ahead for American policy makers was to concentrate on
how to stem the falling tide of their economy. The post-world war economy ofU.S
depended mainly on 'handouts' and subsidies from the state to invest in the military
industry. After the collapse of the so-called Socialist bloc, attention was focused on
the co~petitivenessof American industries and ways to protect American property
rights as a result of falling profits. Another factor that has played into the hands of
8 • Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. The Tory Wreckord (Ottawa: CCPA, 1993) p-
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policy makers is a consequence ofnew infonnation technology ofwhich the u.s.
has been rated as the leading innovator; fears are expressed that open access to
these innovations on the world market would undennine American economic
dominance of the world economy.
Other analysts described the new surge in intellectual property right as a
result of the globalization of the world's economy. They claim the increasing
interdependence ofnation-states demands greater control and leverage to protect
intellectual rights if the international competitiveness of industries is to be
preserved. The subjection of advanced capitalist states to this new rigid prescription
of competitiveness is an attempt to establish a new regime of international capital
accumulation for American multinational corporations. To understand the roots of
this issue, an appreciation of the concept of globalization. and how it can be used to
help multinational corporations to intervene in the domestic economy ofnation
states is essential. John Shields and Stephen McBride defme globalization as
characterized by three features:
the frrst is the creation of larger markets-the nation-state can no longer
satisfy the needs ofmultinational corporations, so big business is
demanding larger trading areas; second, in this new environment
capital has become increasingly mobile; and third, there has been
greater global specialization ofproduction.9
While David Held describes globaliz"ation as a new
9. John Shields and Stephen McBride Dismantling a Nation (Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing, 1993)p-20
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international order involving the emergence of a global economic
system which stretches beyond the control of a singl.e state (even of
dominant states;) the expansion ofnetworks of transnational linkages
and communications over which particular states have little influence;
the enonnous growth of international organizations which can limit the
scope for action of the most powerful states; the development of a
global military order...which can reduce the range ofpolicies available
to government and their citizens.10
This new direction ofpolitical and economic policy means that dependent
developed states like Canada and other developing and less-developing countries
will have no alternative but to shed the remnants oftheir protectionist policies and
experience the hard realities of capitalist market development. Failure to do so will
cast them as outcasts of the new international economic order and thus run the risk
of isolation and exposure to collective punishment from the 'international
community'. A good example in point is CUSFTA and NAFTA.
The new global order requires the rapid transnationalization ofnation-states
and their political, social and economic institutions. This will manifest itself in a
new approach to democracy, where dominant institutions and agencies of the
international economic community under the influence ofmultinationals will be
given priority over domestic institutions in the policy process in the interest of
capital. An important adage to the concept of globalism is the internationalization of
the role of the state particularly among developed nations. More especially, there is
10. David Held "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?", Political
Studies, XL, Special Issue, 1992, p-32-4. cited in Leo Panitch in , Globalisation and the State.
Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1994). p-62
























































































